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INTRODUCTION

Rarely does a constitutional provision escape notice. Yet a
pivotal provision of the United States Constitution suffers from
uncertainty and neglect. Article I, Section 5 states that each
House of Congress "shall be the Judge of the Elections . . . of its
own Members,"' and this provision potentially affects nearly 500
congressional races each election cycle. Indeed, it already has
governed the resolution of hundreds of contested elections. 2 Yet its
meaning has received virtually no interpretive attention at the
national level-not by Congress, not by the federal courts, and not
by scholars. This Article exposes the interpretive vacuum, and it
begins to fill it.
The meaning of Article I, Section 5 has far-reaching
implications: it directly affects democratic governance in the
United States by giving a partisan body the power to dictate the
This Article sets forth a novel
outcomes of its elections. 3
interpretive theory for this constitutional provision, one that
empowers Congress to replace the confused and inconsistent
regime that currently governs these adjudications with a clearer
and more sensible set of rules. Without such reform, the law of
congressional elections will continue to impede the fair and
accurate resolution of election disputes-and threaten a political
crisis.
In its investigation of Article I, Section 5, this Article identifies
three culprits contributing to the interpretive vacuum. The most

1U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 ("Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns
and Qualifications of its own Members. . . ."). This provision governs all federal elections
except for those associated with the presidential race. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104
(2000) (adjudicating dispute over results in presidential election).
2 See infra note 51 and accompanying text; see also Richard L. Hasen, Election Law's
Path in the Roberts Court's First Decade: A Sharp Right Turn but with Speed Bumps and
Surprising Twists, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1629-30 (2016) (discussing trends in electionrelated litigation).
3 See Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 653 (2001)
(providing justification for letting legislatures resolve contests over their own elections);
Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 715-16 (2001)
(exploring the role of partisan politics in high-profile election disputes); cf. Samuel
Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 643-45, 647-48
(2002) (debating the merits of removing the power to redistrict from insider political
operatives); Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for
Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 650,
653 (2002) (providing a counterargument to Issacharoffs position).
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culpable is Congress.
Each House of Congress enjoys the
protection and power accorded by Article I, Section 5, but neither
House has spoken authoritatively as to its meaning or reach. 4 The
federal judiciary also is responsible. While the federal courts
normally take command over ambiguous federal dictates, they
have treated this particular issue as though it is one for Congress
to address.5 Without a set of precedents robust enough to trigger
the nationwide debate that scholars typically deliver, the third
culprit-the academy-likewise has failed to fill the analytical
void. 6
This Article reveals what therefore passes as federal
constitutional law in this area: a chaotic set of ad hoc, state-based
interpretations that vary drastically by jurisdiction. Some states,
for example, have interpreted Article I, Section 5 to permit courts
to adjudicate congressional election contests.7
Others have
concluded the opposite. 8 Through such conflicting interpretations,
state courts have contributed to a deep, intractable split on the
provision's meaning and reach.
State legislatures have
compounded the discord by enacting statutes that codify their
interpretations, a move that renders their constitutional
determinations practically unreviewable. 9
Meanwhile, both
Houses of Congress continue to adjudicate these congressional
election contests themselves. 10 This has allowed each House to
articulate its view of Article I, Section 5 through two means, both
inadequate: conclusory resolutions that do not address the reach or
effect of the constitutional command and committee reports that
do not represent the views of the entire body.11 This motley
collection of precedents is what currently constitutes the law of
Article I, Section 5. It is a regime governed by authorities that are
confused, conflicting, non-authoritative, and outdated.
To be clear, the inconsistencies are not due to experimentation
or policy divides. The differences among states do not reflect their
status as laboratories of democracy. Instead, this divide tracks
See infra Section II.c.
I See infra Section II.B.
6 See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
7 See infra Section III.A.
8 See infra Section IIIB.
See infra notes 136-46 and accompanying text.
10 See infra Section II.A.
11 See infra Section I.c.
4
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fundamental disagreements over the meaning of Article I, Section
5,12 and it confirms that jurisdictions are struggling to reconcile
the constitutional command with state control over election
administration. 13 The harm caused by this arrangement is
significant. Without clarification of basic procedural questions,
election contests are governed by unpredictability and uncertainty,
which in turn leads to the potential for partisan manipulation,
illegitimacy, and delay. 14 Serious concerns in any context, these
problems are particularly acute in the context of disputed federal
elections, where the need for legitimate, accurate, and timely
Moreover, without a
resolution of disputes is at an apex. 15
sensible resolution of forum-related confusion, election contests
are adjudicated in a suboptimal fashion,1 6 with some states
offering no judicial forum at all.' 7 All the while, both the House
and the Senate are grappling with state interference in their own
adjudications.1 8 Particularly given the skyrocketing rates of postelection disputes,1 9 there looms, in the background of every
congressional election, a threat of a political crisis. 20
Despite the depth of the confusion, a resolution is possible.
This Article asserts that Article I, Section 5 itself offers previously
unrecognized answers to its procedural quandaries. 2 1 Namely, as
the "Judge" of these elections, Congress gets to decide how they
are resolved. Congress, in other words, gets to decide whether
courts may participate in this process, and, if so, how. 2 2 As this
Article will explain, Congress's actions thus far indicate tacit

.

12 As close analysis of the legal landscape reveals, while some of the variation associated
with this deep split might be due to policy differences, its central cause is conflicting
interpretations of the federal constitutional mandate. See infra note 176 and accompanying
text; see also infra notes 140-45, 156-61, 182-90 and accompanying text. See generally
infra Part III.
13 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations. .
14 See infra Section IV.B.
15 See infra Section IV.B.
16 See infra Section IV.A.
17 See infra Section I.B.
18 See infra Section I.B.
19 See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
21 See infra Section W.A.
22 See infra Section W.A.
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approval of state court proceedings. 23 Yet tacit approval is no way
to run an election, and Congress's indeterminate gestures have not
made for good law. Nor have they made for good outcomes: flaws
in the current system already may have changed the outcomes of
elections and decreased the legitimacy enjoyed by those eventually
seated. 24 Congress can, and it should, act to clarify its preferences
pursuant to Article I, Section 5, and it should do so in a way that
advances the values that are essential to fair and accurate
elections. 25
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II documents the
conditions that have produced the unusual interpretive vacuum.
It reveals that Article I, Section 5 raises questions that demand
resolution. One such question, as simple and inescapable as it is
overlooked and unresolved, goes to the question of forum. Does
Article I, Section 5 allow courts to adjudicate congressional
election contests? Using this inquiry as an anchor, this Article
exposes the failure of federal authorities to address the provision's
ambiguities, much less to resolve them. The scholarly community,
for its part, appears not to have recognized that these issues exist.
This phenomenon can be understood as an interpretive vacuum.
This Article identifies both the legal and the practical
consequences.
Part III describes the dizzying legal landscape.
Court-like proceedings, in both the House and Senate, operate
alongside an inconsistent and capricious state-based regime for
judging congressional election contests.
In some jurisdictions,
state legislatures have opened their courthouse doors to thwarted
congressional candidates. Other jurisdictions have slammed those
doors shut. Still other jurisdictions attempt to split the difference,
as they permit courts to adjudicate congressional election contests
but only pursuant to a sui generis set of rules. Inconsistency is the
constant.
Part IV begins by proposing a novel theory of Article I, Section
5. This theory understands the constitutional mandate both to
empower Congress and to accommodate court adjudication of
congressional election contests.
This Part then explores the
practical effects of not embracing a unifying theory. The existing
regime harms values fundamental to democracy in the United
23

See infra Section W.A.

24 See infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
25 See infra PartV.
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States, as it injects uncertainty and inappropriate procedure into
the adjudication of political disputes.
It does so, moreover,
precisely at the moment that a stable and effective legal regime is
most vital.
Part V concludes with a proposal for reform. It explores four
ways that Congress could replace the confused, inconsistent
regime with a set of procedures governed by a clear and sensible
design. Ultimately, it advocates that Congress adopt the least
drastic. Congress should, first, confirm its desire to rely on state
court adjudication and, second, regulate the process.
More
specifically, it should impose procedures such as those relating to
exhaustion, timing, and evidence preservation. This simple but
powerful move would help to ensure impartial, timely, accurate,
and constitutional adjudications of disputed congressional
elections-adjudications that would then be subject to plenary
final review by either House of Congress. The result would not
only calm the procedural waters; it would help, in future elections,
to prevent the disorder that this interpretive vacuum otherwise
threatens to impose.
II. THE INTERPRETIVE VACUUM
The Constitution requires each House of Congress to judge the
elections and returns of its own members. 26 Yet courts frequently
are asked to intervene.
To what extent is such intervention
constitutional? Despite the importance of this question, 27 there is
close to no academic commentary on the subject. 28 And despite the

26

For a discussion of the distinction between elections and returns, see infra note 36.

27 See infra Part IV.B.
28 The very small collection of scholarly works addressing this question includes Paul E.
Salamanca & James E. Keller, The Legislative Privilege to Judge the Qualifications,
Elections, and Returns of Members, 95 KY. L.J. 241 (2006-2007), which addresses the
meaning of an analogous provision of the Kentucky Constitution, and Kristen R. Lisk, Note,
The Resolution of Contested Elections in the U.S. House of Representatives: Why State
Courts Should Not Help with the House Work, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1213 (2008), which
explores the policy implications of state court adjudication in this context and provides one
constitutional theory concerning Article I, Section 5. Other academic works discuss the
implications of Article I, Section 5 without addressing the depth of the confusion
surrounding this provision or exploring the broad split it has created. See, e.g., Franita
Tolson, CongressionalAuthority to Protect Voting Rights After Shelby County and Arizona
Inter Tribal, 13 ELECTION L.J. 322 (2014) (discussing Congress's authority to judge elections
under Article I, Section 5 and the extent to which it grants Congress authority to regulate
voter qualifications); Joshua A. Douglas, ProceduralFairness in Election Contests, 88 IND.
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importance of the question to the federal interest-and
notwithstanding a rise in the rate of disputed electionS 29-no
federal authority has filled the legal gap. Congress as a whole has
not weighed in; neither House has provided clear guidance; and
the federal courts have failed to pick up the slack. 30 This vacuum
in the law subjects states' election regimes to a pressure they are
not able to handle, and the result is uncertainty and confusion. 3 1
This Part provides the background necessary to understand this
legal phenomenon. It begins by describing the constitutional
questions facing each potential litigant (and each potential forum)
once a congressional election devolves into litigation. 3 2 It then
exposes the failure of federal authorities to answer these
consequential questions of federal law. 33
A. THE OPEN CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

Elections held biennially in the United States routinely trigger
battles over the results of congressional races. 34 Yet the procedure
of congressional election contests is plagued by profound and
(By using the term "congressional
consequential ambiguity.
election contests," this Article means to refer to disputes, brought
after a congressional election has taken place, concerning the

L.J. 1, 24 (2013) (explaining that Congress's power to judge elections is a "lasting legacy of
our Founding Fathers and a function of the separation of powers") [hereinafter Douglas,
Procedural Fairness]; Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 265, 321-322 (2007) (discussing the policy implications of Congress's power pursuant
to Article I, Section 5, and similar state constitutional provisions); Derek T. Muller,
Scrutinizing Federal Electoral Qualifications, 90 IND. L.J. 559, 595 (2015) (noting, in the
context of an examination of federal electoral qualifications, that "states cannot interfere
with Congress's ability to make an independent judgment, and states can only engage in a
ministering manner, not an adjudicative manner").
29 See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 2, at 1629-30 (discussing "the high rate of election
litigation the country has witnessed since Bush v. Gore," a rate that continues to rise); see
also Joshua A. Douglas, Discouraging Election Contests, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1015, 1015
(2013) ("[P]reparing for post-election litigation is now a routine part of campaign strategy.").
30 See infra Sections 1I.B, II.C.
31 See infra Part III.
32 See infra Section II.A.
33 See infra Sections II.B, II.C.
34 See 2 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY GUIDE TO CONGRESS 833 (5th ed. 2000) (quoting
FLOYD M. RIDDICK, THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS: ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE 12

(1949)) ("Seldom if ever has a Congress organized without some losing candidate for a seat
in either the Senate or House contesting the . . . election in which the losing candidate
participated.").

2017]

JUDGING CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

367

winner of that same election. 35) As this Section reveals, the
confusion in this area derives from Article 1, Section 5.
This constitutional provision designates each House of Congress
as the judge of its elections. 36 Both Houses have responded by
adjudicating election contests within their own walls. It may seem
odd to vest power in this way-that is, to vest power to judge
legislative elections in the legislative body itself-but the
arrangement has a long historical pedigree. It predates the
3
So defined, a congressional election contest may occur either before or after the state's
certification of the election. This definition may be more inclusive than other definitions of
the term-such as those that would limit its use to disputes brought in a court after the
state's certification of the election results-but, as this Article argues, these differences in
definition do not affect the Article I, Section 5 analysis. See infra Section III.A (explaining
that the most plausible reading of Article I, Section 5 does not distinguish among these
different types of post-election proceedings in determining what states may do). A brief
discussion of the implicated terminology nevertheless may be helpful, given that many
jurisdictions use a similar set of terms to describe phases of post-election disputes. After an
election, a dispute normally is first addressed in an administrative proceeding, which is
often referred to as a "recount." At the conclusion of this initial stage, jurisdictions
generally "certify" the results of the recount, and this certification-when brought before
the relevant legislative or judicial body-normally serves as powerful evidence of how many
validly cast votes each candidate has received. Many jurisdictions then allow parties to
dispute the certified results in the courts through a proceeding often referred to as a
"judicial contest." See generally Edward B. Foley, The Lake Wobegone Recount: Minnesota's
Disputed 2008 U.S. Senate Election, 10 ELECTION L.J. 129 (2011) (describing this process
unfolding in Minnesota); MARIE GARBER & ABE FRANK, CONTESTED ELECTIONS AND
RECOUNTS 1: ISSUES AND OPTIONS IN RESOLVING DISPUTED FEDERAL ELECTIONS (William C.
Kimberling ed., 1990). The state's certification often serves, for various purposes, as a
bright line. It nevertheless remains difficult to draw precise boundaries distinguishing
between these various stages of the post-election proceedings, not least of all because
litigants sometimes bring judicial claims prior to certification and because each jurisdiction
has its own set of institutions and rules. As suggested above, the difficult task of
definitively distinguishing among these phases does not seem to be necessary to
understanding the meaning or implications of Article I, Section 5.
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members. . . ."). Unless otherwise indicated, this Article uses the
term "elections" to refer both to elections and to returns. This is because the two are
related. To the extent that "Elections" are distinct from "Returns," it is insofar as the latter
refers to a report on the vote count, whereas the former refers to the election proceedings
that led to the count. See, e.g., Case XXIV: Spaulding v. Mead, United States Congress,

House Committee on Elections, CASES OF CONTESTS ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, FROM THE

YEAR 1789 TO 1834, INCLUSIVE 157, 159 (M. St. Clair Clarke & David A. Hall eds., 1834)
(indicating that where the election phase ends, the returns phase begins); cf. Foster v. Love,
522 U.S. 67, 71 (1997) ("When the federal statutes speak of 'the election' of a Senator or
Representative, they plainly refer to the combined actions of voters and officials meant to
make a final selection of an officeholder. . . ."). As for the final term in this list"Qualifications"-this refers to the "requirements of age, citizenship, and residence
contained in Art. I, § 2, of the Constitution," Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 489 (1969),
and it is not the subject of this Article.
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Constitution, 37 and similar provisions have been adopted in the
constitutions of nearly every state. 38 Evidence suggests that the
drafters of the Constitution assumed that such power was both
"axiomatic" and critical for the protection of a legislative body. 39
The Founders were particularly concerned, after the failures of the
Articles of Confederation, with the threat posed by uncooperative
states. This concern was acute given a related provision of the
Constitution: Article I, Section 4, which assigns to each state the
primary responsibility for administering federal elections. 40 As
Alexander Hamilton noted, relying on states to run congressional
election risks "leav[ing] the existence of the Union entirely at their
mercy." 4 1 It therefore became necessary to provide ways in which
each House of Congress could protect itself.
In exercising its adjudicative power pursuant to Article I,
Section 5, each House "acts as a judicial tribunal." 42 In fulfilling
its duties, each is able to examine witnesses, manage discovery,

3
See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("In the formative
years of the American republic, it was 'the uniform practice of England and America' for
legislatures to be the final judges of the elections and qualifications of their members.");
F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 247 (1911) ("The commons
claim a right to determine all questions relating to the election of members of their house.").
38 See Douglas, Procedural Fairness, supra note 28, at 5-6, n.27 (listing similar
provisions in nearly all state constitutions).
39 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 56-85, pt. 1, at 13 (1900) ("We do not think that this proposition
needs amplifying; it is axiomatic."); see also Morgan, 801 F.2d at 447 ("The fragments of
recorded discussion imply that many took for granted the legislative 'right of judging of the
return of their members,'. . . and viewed it as necessarily and naturally exclusive."); 1
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 833, at
604-05 (Melvin M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1994) ("If [the power to judge elections is] lodged in
any other than the legislative body itself, its independence, its purity, and even its existence
and action may be destroyed or put into imminent danger. No other body but itself can
have the same motives to preserve and perpetuate these attributes; no other body can be so
perpetually watchful to guard its own rights and privileges from infringement, to purify and
vindicate its own character, and to preserve the rights and sustain the free choice of its
constituents.").
4 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.. . ."); cf. U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 808-09 (1995) ("The Framers feared that the
diverse interests of the States would undermine the National Legislature, and thus they
adopted provisions intended to minimize the possibility of state interference with federal
elections.").
41 U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 809 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 616 (1929).
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and inspect ballots, among other powers. 43 To help facilitate these
efforts, both Houses have adopted adjudicative procedures. In the
House, legislators have adopted procedures consistent with the
Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA), a statute enacted in 1969
that sets forth procedures for challengers to contest elections. 44
Similar in many ways to rules of civil procedure, the FCEA sets
forth a procedural framework for adjudication. It provides for
notice, filings, service, and discovery, among other procedural
mechanisms.4 5 Gaps-both substantive and procedural-are filled
through internal House rules and a loose sort of precedent created
through committee reports. 46 These committee reports, normally
drafted by the Committee on House Administration, 4 7 document
each election contest and provide support for the committee's
ultimate recommendation, which takes the form of a proposed
(For example, the committee might propose a
resolution.
resolution dismissing the contest. 48) The proposed resolutions are
then voted on by the full House. 49 If approved, these resolutions
represent the views of the entire body. By contrast, the committee
50
reports represent the views of only a small number of members.
In accordance with this approach, the House has resolved
hundreds of contested elections and published nearly as many
43 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880) (discussing each House's "undoubted
right to examine witnesses and inspect papers").
- See Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting that the FCEA
"establishes certain procedures ... by which an election contest with respect to a seat in the
House of Representatives shall be conducted").
46 2 U.S.C. §§ 381-396.
46 A committee report is "[a] report from a committee to a deliberative assembly on
business referred to the committee or on a matter otherwise under its charge." Committee
See generally infra Section II.C
report, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
(discussing committee reports addressing disputed congressional elections).
47 By rule, election contests fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on House
Administration. See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, R. X(1)(k)(12), at 7 (2015),
Once such a matter is referred to this
http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf.
Committee, it will investigate the dispute and recommend a resolution. See U.S. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES, A HISTORY OF THE COMMI'PEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION: 1947-2012,

at 115-17 (2012) (explaining the role of the Committee on House Administration in
contested elections). In response to more complicated contests, the Committee might
appoint a bipartisan panel or Task Force to help with this work. See infra note 131 and
accompanying text.
4
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 47, at 116.
4 Id.
5 See George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other 'Benign Fictions'" The
Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative
History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 44.
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committee reports addressing the law and facts of each of the
underlying disputes. 5 1
The Senate, for its part, has "developed a series of informal
precedents" to guide its adjudication of election contests. 52 More
specifically, it has established a "custom" of allowing an aggrieved
candidate to file a petition stating his claims. 53 Non-frivolous
petitions normally get referred to the Senate Committee on Rules
and Administration.5 4 The Committee then engages in the work of
adjudication: it considers the arguments of counsel, it solicits the
testimony of witnesses, it inspects ballots, and the like.5 5

It too

publishes committee reports and eventually passes resolutions.5 6
In short, both Houses of Congress have created procedural
frameworks in response to the Article I, Section 5 mandate. This
infrastructure allows each House to serve as the adjudicator of
contested congressional elections.
What neither has done,
however, is to clarify the role that other institutions should play in
adjudicating congressional election disputes.
In response to this vacuum, dissatisfied individuals routinely
petition not only either House of Congress, but also state and
federal courts, demanding that their claims be adjudicated in
these various forums.
51 See Jeffery A. Jenkins, Partisanshipand Contested Election Cases in the House of
Representatives, 1789-2002, 18 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 112, 115 (2004) (counting over 600
disputed elections in the House through 2002). See generally ANNE M. BUTLER & WENDY
WOLFF, UNITED STATES SENATE ELECTION, EXPULSION AND CENSURE CASES, 1793-1990

(1995) [hereinafter BUTLER & WOLFF, ELECTION CASES] (detailing nearly 150 more cases in
the Senate through 1990).
52 SENATE
HISTORICAL OFFICE, SENATE PROCEDURES IN CONTESTED ELECTIONS
[hereinafter SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE, SENATE PROCEDURES], http://www.senate.gov/art

andhistory/history/common/contested elections/procedures-contestedelections.htm
(last
visited Feb. 12, 2016); see also BUTLER & WOLFF, ELECTION CASES, supra note 51, at xiiiXxv.

53 Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 27 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
54 This is also called the Senate Rules Committee. For a stretch of time prior to 1947, the
committee responsible for such work was the Senate Committee on Privileges and
Elections. In 1947, the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections was converted into a
subcommittee organized under the Committee on Rules and Administration. It remained
as such until 1977, when the Senate abolished the subcommittee. BUTLER & WOLFF,
ELECTION CASES, supra note 51, at xix-xx.
55 Roudebush, 405 U.S. at 27 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also SENATE HISTORICAL
OFFICE, SENATE PROCEDURES, supra note 52 ("[T]he Full Rules Committee continues to be
responsible for contested election cases.").
16 See SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE, SENATE COMMITTEES, http://www.senate.gov/artand
history/history/common/briefing/committees.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) (explaining the
procedures of Senate Committees).
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Many petition the state courts.5 7 Some petition both state
courts and either House of Congress.5 8 Occasionally, someone will
attempt to petition the federal courts.5 9 These differences reflect
not only variations among candidates' legal strategies, but also, as
discussed below, the jurisdictions' uneven treatment of Article I,
Section 5.60 These factors combine to produce a confused and
unpredictable set of procedural pathways. Sometimes an election
dispute will be adjudicated by a single House of Congress, and no
else. 6 1 Other times, the dispute will be adjudicated by a House of
57 This occurred in Minnesota in 2008, for example, when Al Franken ran against Norm
Coleman in one of the closest elections in the history of the Senate. After a recount resulted
in a lead for Franken of 225 votes-out of over two million cast-Coleman filed an election
contest in the Minnesota state courts. The trial-level proceedings took months, and it was
not until over seven months after Election Day (and nearly half a year into the
congressional term) that the Minnesota Supreme Court issued its final judgment. See

generally JAY WEINER, THIS Is NOT FLORIDA (2010).
58 This occurred in Connecticut in 1994, for example, when Edward Munster ran against
Sam Gejdenson in one of the closest elections in the history of the House of Representatives.
Anthony Pioppi & John McDonald, Munster Gives Up House Seat Battle, HARTFORD COURANT,
Apr. 29, 1995, http://articles.courant.com/1995-04-29/news/9504290580_1_election-results-elec
After a recount, both candidates filed petitions with the
tion-process-rep-sam-gejdenson.
Supreme Court of Connecticut, which engaged in extensive proceedings before concluding that
Gejdenson had won the election by a margin of twenty-one votes. See In re Election of the
United States Representative for the Second Cong. Dist., 653 A.2d 79, 94 (Conn. 1994)
(concluding that "there is no merit to Munster's claim for a new election" and that "Gejdenson
was duly elected . .. as the United States Representative"). Munster responded by filing a
notice of contest in the House of Representatives, which decided to seat Gejdenson pending
those proceedings. Eventually, citing concerns over delay, Munster withdrew his challengesix months after the election took place. See Pioppi & MacDonald, supranote 58 (detailing the
progression of the election contest).
59 This occurred, for example, after the razor-thin 1984 contest between Richard
McIntyre and Frank McCloskey (for Indiana's "Bloody Eighth" Congressional District)
See infra note 76 and
produced a cluster of federal court lawsuits and decisions.
accompanying text (listing some of the cases). The federal courts rebuffed all attempts at
adjudication, however, and eventually, the House, which was controlled by Democrats,
resolved the dispute by seating McCloskey. House Republicans responded by walking out

in protest. See EDWARD B. FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES 266 (2016).

6o See generally infra Section JI.B, Part III.
61 See BUTLER & WOLFF, ELECTION CASES, supra note 51, at 364-67, 374-75, 380-87
(1995) (describing, among other contests, Neal v. Stewart, a challenge in 1939 by Neal in the
Senate; Willis v. Van Nuys, a challenge in 1939 by Willis in the Senate; Neal v. Stewart,
another challenge in 1943 by Neal in the Senate; Markey v. O'Conor, a challenge in 1946 by
Markey in the Senate; Sweeney v. Kilgore, a challenge in 1947 by Sweeney in the Senate;
and Hook v. Ferguson, a challenge in 1949 by Hook in the Senate); see also L. PAIGE
WHITAKER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONTESTED ELECTION CASES IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 1933 TO 2009, at 21, 33-34 (2010) (describing Oliver v. Hale, a

challenge by Oliver in the House, resolved in 1958, where the state courts had refused to
hear the challenge; and Paul v. Gammage, a challenge by Paul in the House, resolved in
1977, where the state courts had refused to hear the challenge).
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Congress as well as by the state courts. 62 Still other times, either
House defers-expressly or otherwise-to the state courts and
then seats the winning candidate without conducting any
substantive adjudication itself.63 Perhaps unsurprisingly, litigants

frequently battle over questions of forum, and courts often seem to
be at a loss with respect to how to resolve those procedural
disputes. 64
Taken together, these contested congressional elections have
produced a collection of high-stakes, high-profile cases being
inconsistently adjudicated or thrown out by a variable combination
of state courts, federal courts, and each House of Congress. As
discussed below, this dynamic is highly problematic. 6 5 To mitigate
such damage, the underlying question-the extent to which Article
I, Section 5 limits the involvement of courts in congressional
election contests-requires resolution. Yet as discussed above,
there remains exceedingly little academic literature on the
subject. 6 6 The federal courts have contributed only a spotty set of
precedents on the question of how to interpret this provision-a
phenomenon discussed in the next Section. 67 And neither House of
Congress has provided a definitive answer. 68
This leaves
fundamental questions (about, among other things, the federal
structure and the institution of Congress) not to a federal
authority, but instead to state entities that lack the ability to
resolve nationwide splits. This ensures precisely the sort of
62 See BUTLER & WOLFF, ELECTION CASES, supra note 51, at 355-58, 426-28 (describing
Chavez v. Cutting, a challenge over the 1934 election brought by Chavez in both the state
courts and the Senate; and Edmondson v. Bellmon, a challenge over the 1974 election
brought by Edmondson in both the state courts and the Senate); see also WHITAKER, supra
note 61, at 37-38, 39-40, 46 (describing Jennings v. Buchanan, a challenge over the 2006
election brought by Jennings in both the state courts and the House; McCloskey v. McIntyre,
an investigation over the 1984 election initiated by the House, where McCloskey also
brought challenges in both the federal and state courts; and Thorsness v. Daschle, a
challenge over the 1978 election brought by Thorsness in both the House and state courts).
63 See WEINER, supra note 57, at 16-18 (describing the 2008 election contest, where the
contestant challenged the election results in Minnesota state courts but not before the
Senate); see also Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 18 (1972) (noting that the Senate had
seated the contestee "'without prejudice to the outcome of an appeal pending in the
Supreme Court of the United States, and without prejudice to the outcome of any recount
that the Supreme Court might order"' (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 6 (1971))).
64 See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
65 See infra Section IV.B.
66 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
67 See infra Section H.B.
68 See infra Section I.C.
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uncertainty and concerns over neutrality that are best avoided in
69
such a consequential area of the law.
B. RETICENCE BY THE FEDERAL COURTS

The federal courts frequently serve as arbiters of federal law,
and they have particular expertise with respect to questions of
procedure. However, in the context of congressional election
contests-where the federal interest is so profound and questions
of procedure so important-the federal courts have offered only a
handful of precedents on point. The doctrine that emerges is
confusing and ambiguous, and it fails to provide definitive
answers. It nevertheless leads to at least one conclusion: under
current law, federal courts almost certainly will not adjudicate
congressional election contests themselves. 70
Analysis of this doctrine begins with two propositions of law
that the federal courts have managed to articulate more clearly.
The first is that Article I, Section 5 does not impose significant
obstacles to nonjudicial state proceedings, such as recounts.71 The
second is that Article I, Section 5 does pose an obstacle to federal
court adjudication of congressional election contests, at least once
either House of Congress has unconditionally seated a member. 72
Outside of these two narrow propositions, the law of Article I,
Section 5 is unsettled in the federal courts. 73 These courts have
not directly resolved, for example, the extent to which Article I,
Section 5 imposes restrictions on state judicial proceedings, as
opposed to state nonjudicial (i.e., administrative) proceedings.
And they have not clarified whether federal courts may open their
doors for adjudication prior to the unconditional seating of a

69 See infra Section IV.B.
70 The justiciability of a case such as Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), is not implicated
by this line of cases because Article I, Section 5 applies to congressional races, not
presidential elections. Likewise, the justiciability of a case such as Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), is not clearly implicated by the discussion
because Article I, Section 5 has been understood to apply to election contests, not to
generally applicable litigation instigated prior to Election Day. For a definition of
"congressional election contests," see supra note 35.
71 See Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 26 (1972) (holding that Article I, Section 5 "does
not prohibit Indiana from conducting a recount of the 1970 election ballots for United States
Senator"); see also infra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
72 See infra notes 76, 89-102 and accompanying text.
7
To an even greater degree, the law is unsettled in the state courts. See infra Part m.
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member-particularly if Congress were to authorize such a
proceeding. A review of the little case law that does exist provides
some hint into how the doctrine is likely to evolve. Even more so,
however, this review of the doctrine helps to reveal why states
have struggled so mightily in looking for answers as they attempt
to administer congressional elections.74
The two clearly articulated propositions of law emerge from a
small collection of sources: a Supreme Court case called
Roudebush v. Hartke7 5 and a cluster of related decisions that this
Article refers to as the McCloskey cases.7 6 In Roudebush, the
Supreme Court had been asked to decide whether Article I, Section
5 allowed a state to administer a post-election recount.7 7
Concluding that it did allow such proceedings, the Court explained
that while "a State's verification of the accuracy of election results
pursuant to its Art. I, § 4, powers is not totally separable from the
Senate's power to judge elections and returns," a recount does not
cross the Article I, Section 5 line unless it "frustrates the Senate's
ability to make an independent final judgment."7 8 This rule
applies, the Court held, even if the Senate already has seated the
apparent victor of that election. 79 Because, in the case before it,
the recount did not "prevent the Senate from independently
evaluating the election any more than the initial count [did],"
Article I, Section 5 posed no bar.8 0
In light of this language, Roudebush can be read broadly to
permit any post-election state proceeding-whether administrative
or judicial in nature-to go forward so long as that proceeding does
not somehow interfere with either House's ability to conduct its

See infra Part III.
405 U.S. 15 (1972).
See Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1986); McIntyre v. Fallahay,
766 F.2d 1078, 1080-81 (7th Cir. 1985); McIntyre v. O'Neill, 766 F.2d 535, 535 (D.C. Cir.
1985); Barkley v. O'Neill, 624 F. Supp. 664, 667-68 (S.D. Ind. 1985).
77 Roudebush, 405 U.S. at 23-24.
78 Id. at 25.
79 Id. at 18. The Senate had seated Senator Hartke conditionally, i.e., "without prejudice
to the outcome of an appeal pending in the Supreme Court of the United States." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
80 Id. at 25. See also id. at 25-26 ("The Senate is free to accept or reject the apparent
winner in either count, and, if it chooses, to conduct its own recount." (citations omitted)).
74

76
76
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Indeed, multiple authorities have read
own proceedings.
Roudebush in this manner.8 1
This broad reading of Roudebush squares with the Court's
reasoning in the decision itself, which does not limit its logic to
administrative proceedings. 82 The trouble with this reading is
that many subsequent interpretations of Roudebush have
construed the case much more narrowly. They have concluded
that, in light of the Court's acknowledgement that it was only
addressing administrative proceedings, 83 the case does not bear on
state judicial proceedings.
A decision out of Illinois illustrates this narrow reading of
Concluding that the Supreme Court case was
Roudebush.
84
"inapposite," the court held that the state's judicial proceedings
remained subject to the "long-standing rule that Congress has
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the election contests of its
members" 8 5-and therefore that the state judicial proceedings
needed to be dismissed.8 6 This Illinois precedent, along with a

81 See, e.g., Durkin v. Snow, 403 F. Supp. 18, 20 (D.N.H. 1974) ("We find nothing in the
maintenance of state court proceedings which would subvert the clear and acknowledged
function of the United States Senate to determine whom to seat. No impending state court
action or practice has been called to our attention which would impede the independent
determination of the outcome by the United States Senate."). Likewise, in Franken v.
Pawlenty, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not recognize any constitutional distinction
between judicial and administrative proceedings in its reading of Roudebush. 762 N.W.2d
558, 569 (Minn. 2009). In McIntyre v. Fallahay,the court concluded that the case should be
remanded to the state court without deeming it necessary to "decide whether the Indiana
proceeding was 'judicial'" in nature. 766 F.2d 1078, 1084 (7th Cir. 1985). In McIntyre, the
court also suggested that the result would be the same even after the House or Senate had
seated the relevant member. See id. at 1086; see also id. ("Once the House decides it no
longer cares to have the state's advice, the state is less constrained than before." (emphasis
added)).
82 The Court did find it necessary to determine whether the Indiana proceedings were
administrative or judicial in nature, and it concluded that they were administrative.
Roudebush, 405 U.S. at 20-23. However, it was conducting this analysis not to determine
the effect of Article I, Section 5, but rather to determine the effect of the Anti-Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Id.
8
See Roudebush, 405 U.S. at 20-23 ("The state courts' duties in connection with a
recount may be characterized as ministerial, or perhaps administrative, but they clearly do
not fall within this definition of a 'judicial inquiry.' ").
8
Young v. Mikva, 363 N.E.2d 851, 853 (Ill. 1977); see also id. (rejecting the petitioner's
argument that Roudebush broadly "permits a State to examine election results fully so long
as it does not frustrate the Congress' ability to render a final, independent judgment").
85 Id. at 854.
8

Id.
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collection of authorities in agreement,8 7 confirms that Roudebush
has not come close to settling the question of how Article I, Section
5 affects state judicial proceedings.
Roudebush also fails to address the question of federal court
involvement in the adjudication of congressional election disputes.
While the decision's very existence confirms that the federal courts
can be involved to a limited extent-namely, to the extent
necessary to determine the constitutionality of parallel state
proceedings 8 8-Roudebush
does not speak to the question of
whether a federal court may itself adjudicate the claims raised in a
congressional election contest. Much more on point, in this regard,
are the McCloskey cases.8 9
The McCloskey cases emerged out of the 1984 race in Indiana
between Richard McIntyre and Frank McCloskey.
Initially,
McIntyre appeared to have won the race, but before the state had
concluded its recount proceedings, the House of Representatives
assembled, refused to seat McIntyre, and instead appointed a Task
Force to investigate the election.9 0 This Task Force conducted its

8 See, e.g., Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1977) (distinguishing Roudebush
by noting that the Court there "said that the limited responsibilities involved in the recount
did not constitute a 'court proceeding' "); LaCaze v. Johnson, 305 So. 2d 140, 144-46 (La. Ct.
App. 1974) (interpreting Roudebush as drawing a distinction between recounts not
involving "judicial inquiry," which are compatible with Article I, Section 5, and those that
do constitute judicial action, which are unconstitutional); see also Lisk, supra note 28, at
1225-28 (analyzing three different interpretations of Roudebush concerning the
permissibility of state court action in congressional election contests).
These postRoudebush authorities join the substantial collection of pre-Roudebush opinions almost
universally concluding that Article I, Section 5 prohibits state courts from adjudicating
congressional election contests. See Hartke v. Roudebush, 321 F. Supp. 1370, 1373 (S.D.
Ind. 1970) ('The great weight of authority supports plaintiffs position that court
proceedings for recount or contest with regard to an election for representative in
[Congress] are unconstitutional, as in conflict with Article I, Section 5, whether brought in
state or federal court."), rev'd on other grounds, 405 U.S. 15 (1972); id. (listing cases).
8
Stated otherwise, the Supreme Court's willingness to decide the Roudebush case on the
merits confirms that federal courts may adjudicate challenges to state proceedings, even in
the context of congressional election contests. This is consistent with the conclusions
reached by other federal courts. See, e.g., Durkin v. Snow, 403 F. Supp. 18, 20 (D.N.H.
1974) ("The door of the federal court remains open should it be demonstrated that state
actions or practices are being pursued which deprive the Senate or any candidate of rights
conferred by the federal Constitution.").
89 See supra note 76 (listing some of the cases that emerged from this dispute).
9 FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES, supranote 59, at 259-60.
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own recount and concluded that, in fact, McCloskey had won. 91 On
May 1, 1985, by a party-line vote, the House seated McCloskey. 92
In response to this change of fortunes, McIntyre (and others
aligned with the candidate) filed a series of lawsuits in the federal
courts. 93

These challenges, rebuffed at every turn, produced a

collection of precedents interpreting Article I, Section 5 to prohibit
the federal courts from adjudicating congressional election
contests. In one such decision, Morgan v. United States,94 thenJudge Scalia articulated the question presented to the court as
whether the federal courts "have jurisdiction to review the
substance or procedure of a determination by the House of
Representatives that one of two contestants was lawfully elected to
that body."95 He found the answer clearly to be no. Pointing to the
text of Article I, Section 5, he insisted that "[t]he exclusion of
others-and in particular of others who are judges-could not be
more evident." 9 6
In another McCloskey case, McIntyre v. Fallahay,97 the court
reached a similar conclusion. Judge Easterbrook, who wrote the
opinion, relied on Article I, Section 5 for his conclusion that the
court could do nothing that might even possibly "affect the
outcome of [the] election."98 Because any judicial resolution
therefore would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion, the
case could not proceed in the federal courts.9 9 Noting that the
Indiana state courts were not necessarily bound by the same

e1 See Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
92

Id.

93 See FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES, supra note 59, at 266 ("Republicans also tried to overturn
the outcome in federal court, raising equal protection and due process claims of the kind
that they would present again in Bush v. Gore.").
9 801 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
9s Id.
9
Id. at 447. He further explained: "Because the Constitution so unambiguously
proscribes judicial review of the proceedings in the House of Representatives that led to the
seating of McCloskey, we believe that further briefing and oral argument in this case would
be pointless, and that the decision of the District Court should be summarily affirmed." Id.
at 446-47.
9
766 F.2d 1078 (7th Cir. 1985).
98 Id. at 1081 ("The House is not only 'Judge' but also final arbiter. Its decisions about
which ballots count, and who won, are not reviewable in any court. . . . Nothing we say or
do, nothing the state court says or does, could affect the outcome of this election. Because
the dispute is not justiciable, it is inappropriate for a federal court even to intimate how
Congress ought to have decided." (footnote omitted)).
9 Id.
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prohibition on advisory opinions, Judge Easterbrook remanded the
case.100

The jurisdictional holdings in both Morgan and McIntyre
provide some insight into the Article I, Section 5 line. But both
addressed federal court proceedings occurring after the House had
seated its member. As such, they did not resolve whether Article
I, Section 5 might allow federal courts to adjudicate congressional
election contests in other circumstances, and in particular during
what tends to be the most critical time: prior to either House's
resolution of the dispute. Both decisions nevertheless seem to
suggest that the answer is no, at least in the absence of
congressional authorization. To this end, Morgan repeated the
dicta from Roudebush that "'[w]hich candidate is entitled to be
seated in the Senate is, to be sure, a nonjusticiable political
question-a question that would not have been the business of this
Court even before the Senate acted.' "101 It nevertheless is possible
to read these precedents more narrowly, particularly given the
emphasis both placed on the fact that the House already had
seated McCloskey. In short, while the McCloskey cases do not
necessarily foreclose federal court review in all circumstances,
they provide powerful authority for the proposition that, at least in

100 See id. at 1082 ('The remand of an improvidently removed case allows the state court
to decide for itself whether to proceed. Considerations of federalism.. . . require that district
courts not preclude state courts from hearing disputes that states may deem sufficiently
'live' for their own purposes.").
101 Morgan, 801 F.2d at 449 (emphasis altered) (quoting Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S.
15, 19 (1972)); see also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 612 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Claims concerning constitutional violations committed in [the context of Article I,
Section 5]-for example, the rather grave constitutional claim that an election has been
stolen-cannot be addressed to the courts."). This restrictive view of the federal courts'
power is also consistent with several older decisions. See, e.g., In re James, 241 F. Supp.
858, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (interpreting Article I, Section 5 to mean that "federal courts have
no jurisdiction to pass on the qualifications and the legality of the election of any member of
the House of Representatives"); Keogh v. Horner, 8 F. Supp. 933, 934 (S.D. Ill. 1934)
(declaring that the court was "unable to find any authority, which by any stretch of the
imagination holds or tends to hold that a District Court has any authority to" prohibit a
governor from issuing certificates of election to individuals elected to the House of
Representatives); In re Voorhis, 291 F. 673, 674-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Hand, J.) (concluding
that the federal courts lack the authority to hear challenges to congressional elections
because the Constitution puts that matter exclusively in the hands of Congress).
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the absence of congressional authorization, the federal courts will
refuse to get involved.102
Roudebush and the McCloskey cases, in sum, provide limited
insight.103 These precedents do not rest on broad rulings that
might have provided guidance to states attempting to resolve
congressional election disputes. As a result, there remains a
recurring tension between, on the one side, the constitutional
requirement that each House judge the elections of its own
members and, on the other, the frequent appeals to state and
federal courts to judge these same elections. It is a tension that
the federal courts have failed to resolve-and a tension that
implicates fundamental questions of democratic governance.
C. ABDICATION BY CONGRESS

Amid the confusion surrounding Article I, Section 5, at least one
thing is clear: the provision empowers and protects each House of
Congress. Despite this close relationship, neither House has
spoken definitively on the meaning of the constitutional mandate.
What each House of Congress has done instead is rely on two
means, both inadequate, to address the Article I, Section 5 line.
First, each House has passed resolutions relating to congressional
election contests. These resolutions are authoritative, but they are
short and conclusory and they do not speak at all to the
Second, each House has issued
constitutional command.
the
address
which do occasionally
committee reports,

102 Were Congress to authorize the federal courts to adjudicate congressional election
contests, that would trigger a host of constitutional questions. These are discussed in more
detail below. See infra notes 301-05 and accompanying text.
103 Other precedents, such as Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), are even less
informative. In Powell, the Supreme Court addressed the "Qualifications" language of
Article I, Section 5 and ultimately concluded that the provision did not bar its review. Id. at
518-22. This case is not particularly on point, however, given that the dispute in that case
revolved around whether the House could block an elected individual from being seated
See id. at 522 ("[T]he
based on Qualifications not contained in the Constitution.
Constitution leaves the House without authority to exclude an person, duly elected by his
constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the
Constitution." (emphasis and footnotes omitted)); see also Morgan, 801 F.2d at 448 ("[T]he
holding of the [Powell] case was simply that Article I, section 5 had no application, since the
House action in question did not consist of judging 'qualifications' within the meaning of the
provision."). As for Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), it is of no direct relevance to Article I,
Section 5, which applies to congressional races but not presidential ones. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XII (describing procedures for electing the President and Vice-President).
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constitutional command, but which do not represent the views of
the entire body. Both Houses of Congress therefore have failed to
address Article I, Section 5 in any way that is both on point and
authoritative.
This spotty authority nevertheless allows some
insight into the views of these legislative bodies. That insight
suggests that both Houses endorse an accommodating view of
congressional election contests, one that permits state courts to
adjudicate these disputes and may even require contestants to
exhaust state court remedies. These signals emanating from each
House of Congress are not enough, however, to have resolved the
confusion surrounding the constitutional mandate. 10 4
When speaking authoritatively,
Congress has provided
vanishingly little insight into Article I, Section 5. Each House can
speak authoritatively through several means. Congress as a whole
can do so through the passage of legislation or concurrent
resolutions.1 0 5 Alternatively, each House can speak individually
through the passage of simple resolutions (often referred to more
succinctly as resolutions). 106
Through none of these means, it appears, has either House of
Congress so much as addressed the tension emerging from court
adjudication of congressional election contests. With respect to the
first means, legislation, Congress has not spoken at all on the
meaning of Article I, Section 5. The most on-point legislation, the
FCEA,1 0 7 does not speak to the provision. Likewise, there appear
to be no on-point concurrent resolutions.
Speaking individually, each House of Congress has passed
numerous resolutions addressing (and frequently resolving)
disputed congressional elections. However, it appears that none of
these resolutions has spoken to the question of how Article I,
Section 5 affects court adjudication of election contests. Rather,
the resolutions are generally both short and conclusory. An
example, from the Senate, follows:

See infra Part III.
105 A concurrent resolution is a resolution, "passed by one house and agreed to by the
other," that "expresses the legislature's opinion on a subject but does not have the force of
law." ConcurrentResolution, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
106 A simple resolution is a resolution, "passed by one house only," that "expresses the
opinion or affects the internal affairs of the passing house, but ... does not have the force of
law." Simple Resolution, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
107 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
104
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Calendar No. 1038
"Mr
CONGRESS

Sssio

S. RES. 243
(Aeqtt

IN THE SENATE OF

No. 10211

THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 7 (calendar day, JN

8), 1926

Mr. DENEN, from the Committee on Privileges and Elections, reported the
followm resolution; which was placed on the calendar
atW

16, 192

Considered and agreed to

I

RESOLUTION
Besole*d ,

That Thomas

D

Schal is hereby declared

2

to be a duly elected Senator of the United States from the

3

State of Minnesota, for the term of sis years, commencsng

4

on the 4th day of March. 1925, and is entitled to be seated

6

as such.

This resolution-which, as relevant, reads that "Thomas D.
Schall is hereby declared to be a duly elected Senator of the United
States from the State of Minnesota, for the term of six years,
commencing on the 4th day of March, 1925, and is entitled to be
seated as such"-resolved a disputed election between Schall and
Magnus Johnson, after the latter had brought an election
challenge before the Senate.10 8 The resolution resolving this
dispute, characteristically terse, provides no insight into Article I,
Section 5.
The brevity of these resolutions stand in contrast to the breadth
and depth of a different set of documents-the committee
reports-that so often accompanies the resolutions. Take this
same dispute, between Johnson and Schall. Per Senate procedure,
once Johnson had brought an election contest in the Senate, it was

108 S. Res. 243, 69th Cong. (1926).
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referred to a designated committee. 109 After days of hearings,
which included the airing of legal arguments and the testimony
and cross-examination of witnesses, the Committee issued a tenThis document, typical of
page "report" on its findings. 110
elections, in many ways
contested
committee reports addressing
resembles a court opinion: it includes a summary of the claims,11 1
a description of the evidence, 1 12 and an account of the committee's
findings, both of fact and of law. 113 It is in this final section that
the report addresses the effect of Article I, Section 5 on the judicial
adjudication of election contests. The report notes, first, that
Johnson had failed to bring certain claims before the Minnesota
state courts. 114 It then asserts:
The Senate is a judge of the election and qualification
of its members and a judgment of a court under the
provisions of the Minnesota law referred to would not
be binding upon the Senate, but it would have great
weight. It should not be expected that the Senate act
as a substitute for a district court of that State.1 1 5
This passage makes clear that the Committee on Privileges and
Elections (at least, as composed at the time) construed Article I,
Section 5 to permit state court adjudication of congressional
election contests. Indeed, it seems even to embrace something
akin to an exhaustion principle, as the Committee went on to
recommend rejection of the contest based in part on Johnson's
failure to bring his claims before the Minnesota state courts.

.

"0
S. REP. No. 69-1021, at 1. More specifically, the Senate passed a resolution
empowering the Committee on Privileges and Elections to, among other things, investigate
and report on Johnson's claims. Id. (quoting S. Res. 20, 69th Cong. (1925) ("[T]he
Committee on Privileges and Elections ... is hereby ... authorized and directed to
investigate the charges and countercharges . . . in the matter. .
110 See id. at 1-10.
111 See id. at 2-3 (enumerating the various "allegations" filed by Johnson against Shall).
112 See id. at 3-8 (describing the testimony of witnesses and introduction of evidence
before the Committee).
113 See id. at 8-10 (stating "the opinion of the committee" as to the issues of fact and law
that were raised and "recommend[ing] that the contest in this case be dismissed").
114 See id. at 9 ("No such contest has been filed in the district court of Minnesota where
contestee resides.').
116 Id.
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The full Senate later passed a resolution consistent with the
Committee's recommendation that Schall be seated. (It is the
resolution reprinted above. 1 16) In so doing, however, the Senate
did not vote on whether it concurred with everything contained in
the Committee's report. It simply passed the short and conclusory
resolution seating Schall.
The Committee's treatment of the Johnson claims is no outlier.
To the contrary, a similar pattern has recurred throughout the
Senate's history. 117 Taken in sum, the Senate's committee reports
overwhelmingly support the view that Article I, Section 5 poses no
significant obstacle to state adjudicative proceedings.1 1 8 But none
of these reports is authoritative. It is in this sense that the Senate
has failed to speak authoritatively on the question of the reach of
Article I, Section 5, even when the committee reports address the
matter more directly.1 1 9
A similar pattern holds in the House. A 2007 letter that the
Chair of the House Administration Committee sent to a state court
helps to reveal the House's approach:
In contested House elections, the House customarily
relies on state legal processes to provide a full and fair
airing of contested election issues raised by the
parties. This allows the states the opportunity to fully
discharge their Constitutional responsibility to
conduct Federal elections. These state proceedings

116 S. Res. 243, 69th Cong. (1926); see also S. REP. No. 69-1021, at 1 (1926) (report
produced to "accompany" Senate Resolution No. 243).
117 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 72-1066, at 4 (1933) (indicating approval of state court proceedings
by suggesting that the contest should be dismissed in part because the challenger had failed to
exhaust state court remedies). Some inconsistency among these reports nevertheless does
exist, particularly with respect to whether exhaustion of state court remedies really is

required.

See SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE, SENATE PROCEDURES, supra note 52 (explaining

that "the Senate [has not wanted] to step in where legal action in the federal or state courts
was appropriate, and it seldom took very seriously the claims of a contestant who had failed to
follow these avenues of redress').
118 This conclusion is consistent with the Senate's treatment of the Roudebush litigation,
discussed above, insofar as the Senate seated R. Vance Hartke "without prejudice to the
outcome of an appeal pending in the Supreme Court of the United States, and without
prejudice to the outcome of any recount that the Supreme Court might order." Roudebush
v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 18 (1972) (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 6 (1971)).
11 Although not authoritative, this precedent still provides some insight into the Senate's
views of Article I, Section 5, and this insight may help to resolve ambiguities surrounding
the provision. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
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ordinarily enhance the ability of the House to evaluate
the merits of any pending election contest.1 2 0
Tellingly, the Chair then cited Roudebush.121
This letter was included in a committee report recommending
that the underlying election contest-a dispute between Democrat
Christine Jennings and Republican Vern Buchanan-be
dismissed.1 22 In February 2008 the full House voted to pass the
resolution that the Committee had recommended. As usual, the
resolution included none of the substance of the report:
rv

House Calendar No. 190
110 2Dc"s
SassioN

H.,&S

989

[Report No. 110-5281
Dismissingtheelecdon cones relaingto the office oflepresenative from
the Thirteenth Conptional District of floida.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FEBRUAIY 14, 2005
Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania. from the Commitster on House Administration,
reported the followingresolution; which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

RESOLUTION
Dismissing the election contest relating to the office of Representative from the Thirteenth Congressional District
of Florida.
I

Resolved That the election contest relating to the of-

2 flce of Representative from the Thirteenth Congressional
3 DistrictofFlorida is dismissed.

120 Letter from Juanita Millender-McDonald, Chairman of the Committee on House
Administration, to Jon J. Wheeler, Clerk of the Court for the Florida First District Court of
Appeal (Jan. 4, 2007), in H.R. REP. No. 110-528, pt. 2, at 1461 (2008).
121 Id. (citing Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972)).
122 See H.R. REP. No. 110-528, pt. 1, at 11-12 (2008) (concluding that the election contest
should be dismissed due to the lack of evidence suggesting irregularity in the election).
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Instead, the resolution is short and conclusory, and it does not
address Article I, Section 5.123
The language contained in the committee report nevertheless is
consistent with other House committee reports. 12 4 Occasionally,
however, a report will include language that complicates the
House's state-friendly approach. In 1872, for example, the
Committee of Elections refused even to consider a related decision
by a state supreme court. 125 It explained: "The House being made
by the Constitution the judge of the election returns and
qualifications of its members, cannot delegate its authority to
some other tribunal, and discharge by proxy a solemn duty which
Despite such
the Constitution imposes on the House."1 2 6
precedent, resistance to state court proceedings by the House is a
rarity. For the most part, committee reports from the House
express strong support for states' parallel adjudications of election
contests.
In sum, the authorities emerging from either House offer
insight into each body's views. The committee reports collectively
support the conclusion that Article I, Section 5 accommodates
state judicial proceedings. And this interpretation of Article I,
Section 5 very well may be correct. 127 Yet these reports are not
authoritative, and they have failed to resolve the deep split
characterizing this area of the law. Indeed, the interpretation of
Article I, Section 5 that apparently dominates in each House of
Congress is squarely inconsistent with the conclusions of many
state courts and legislatures across the country. 128
123 As relevant, the House resolution reads: "Resolved, That the election contest relating to
the office of Representative from the Thirteenth -Congressional District of Florida is
dismissed." H.R. Res. 989, 110th Cong. (2008).
(discussing favorably a state court's
124 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 96-785, at 3 (1980)
adjudication of an election dispute). Indeed, some of these reports have gone so far as to
invoke, in an indirect way, an exhaustion requirement similar to that which the Senate has
advanced. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 89-1008, at 2 (1965) (indicating that election challenges
were improper because, inter alia, the contestants had failed to exhaust state and federal
judicial remedies); H.R. REP. No. 76-1722, at 2 (1940) (addressing whether the contestant
had "exhausted his [State] remedy ... before involving the aid of this committee"); id.
(indicating that the contestant had failed to establish that no state remedy was available).
125 H.R. REP. No. 42-10, at 1 (1872) (noting that a state court decision was not "regarded
as evidence by the committee, or entitled to consideration in disposing of the case").
126 Id.
127 See infra Section IV.A (explaining that Article I, Section 5 is best understood to
empower Congress with respect to the question of Article I, Section 5's reach).
128 See infra Part III.
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OF STATE LAW REGIMES

As Part II has revealed, there is an absence of federal
authorities authoritatively addressing questions arising out of the
adjudication of congressional election contests. This is surprising,
for these questions are largely federal in nature. They turn on
interpretations of federal constitutional law that address the
composition and legitimacy of the federal government. The dearth
of federal authorities in this sense constitutes a vacuum, and one
that has dragged in a disordered collection of fifty separate state
regimes. Some of these regimes stem from state statutes; others
from state court decisions.
Collectively, they reflect a deep,
nationwide split on the question of the meaning and reach of
Article I, Section 5.129
Through a combination of case law and legislation, states have
created regimes that fall into three general categories. In the first,
which is discussed in Section III.A, states allow congressional
election contests to proceed in the courts without restriction. In
the second, discussed in Section III.B, states prohibit such
proceedings. In the third, discussed in Section III.C, states have
eked out a middle ground by permitting congressional election
contests to go forward, but with substantive or procedural
constraints on the proceedings. Each of these regimes, to varying
degrees, reflects jurisdictions' understandings of the Article I,
Section 5 line,1 30 and they are in fundamental conflict. The result,
in sum, is a state-driven, patchwork set of regimes for the
resolution of congressional election contests.
A. ADJUDICATING THE CASES THE FEDERAL COURTS WILL NOT

In most states, courts are permitted to adjudicate congressional
election contests.131 These states do not appear to modify their
See infra note 130.
As discussed below, some of the distinctions among jurisdictions are surely due not to
constitutional concerns but instead to policy-motivated differences in state law. However,
many of the state regimes expressly reflect states' conflicting views of the Article I, Section
5 line, and many more are at least consistent with such a conflict. See infra notes 156-76;
see also infra notes 140-45, 156-61, 182-90 and accompanying text.
131 Although unsettled case law and changing election codes makes it difficult to
categorize jurisdictions in a definitive manner, thirty-six states appear, at the time of
publication of this Article, to fall into this category: Alaska, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
129

130

2017]

JUDGING CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

387

legal regimes at all in response to the Article I, Section 5 mandate.
Implicit in each of these regimes, therefore, is the state's
determination that Article I, Section 5 does not require any such
modification.
In California, for example, where every election cycle
potentially leads to dozens of disputed congressional elections, the
state's Election Code sets forth procedures for initiating an
election contest. 132 These contests may be brought in the superior
court of any county in the relevant district. 133 The statutes do not
distinguish between congressional elections and other types of
elections, and the state's courts have confirmed that they do
134 In
authorize the adjudication of congressional election contests.
a recent decision, moreover, the California appellate court
appeared poised to reject the argument that Article I, Section 5
poses any impediment to this regime. 13 5
Further exploration of California's regime reveals an irony.
This is because the California code prohibits contests over a
136
This is
different set of elections: state legislative elections.
consistent with the California state constitution, which has a
provision analogous to Article I, Section 5. It reads, as relevant,
that "Each house of the legislature shall judge the qualifications
and elections of its Members." 137 The California courts have
construed this provision as precluding court adjudication of
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming.
132 CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 16000-16940 (West 2016).
133 Id. § 16400.
134 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Bilbray, No. D049407, 2007 WL 824450, at *3-6 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 20, 2007) (suggesting that a state court can entertain an election challenge without
infringing upon the House's constitutional authority to judge elections).
135 See id. at *5 (indicating "support for contestants' assertion that pursuant to its
independent federal constitutional authority, a state court can entertain an election
challenge even after the House has unconditionally seated the member whose election is at
issue without infringing on the House's constitutional authority to judge elections"). As
such, the appellate court appeared poised to overrule the trial court, which had reached the
opposite conclusion and dismissed the case on that basis. Ultimately, however, the court
concluded it was unnecessary to reach the question in the case before it. Id. (concluding
that the case was moot because Bilbray had already been seated by the House and had
served his entire term of office).
136 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 16200 (West 2016) ("This chapter shall not apply to elections for the
office of state Senator or Member of the Assembly of the California Legislature.").
137 CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
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election contests in state legislative races.13 8
This tensionbetween, on the one hand, construing Article I, Section 5 to allow
court adjudication of congressional election contests and, on the
other, construing analogous state provisions to prohibit court
adjudication of state legislative election contests-exists in other
jurisdictions as well.
This is because nearly every state
constitution has a provision analogous to Article I, Section 5,139
but only a tiny fraction of states allow courts to adjudicate state
legislative election contests. 140
Another jurisdiction representing the majority interpretation of
Article I, Section 5 is South Dakota. Its conclusion-that Article I,
Section 5 permits court adjudication of congressional election
contests-is reflected in a decision by the state supreme court,
which provided a helpful articulation of its reasoning. 14 1 The case
arose out of a close race for the First Congressional District
between Tom Daschle and Leo Thorsness. 142 Once Daschle was
certified the winner, Thorsness responded with multiple
challenges, including one before the United States House of
Representatives and one before the South Dakota Supreme Court.
While these proceedings were unfolding, the House seated
Daschle, though it did not dismiss the election contest pending
against him in the House. 143 Daschle then moved to dismiss in the
state court. The Supreme Court of South Dakota rejected this

138 See, e.g., Chavez v. Cox, No. C061170, 2010 WL 2913044, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
July 27,
2010) (dismissing "election contest," which the contestant tried to reframe as a challenge
concerning the candidate's qualifications and to bring under a. different provision of the
Elections Code, based on the conclusion that "the State Senate, not the courts, has
jurisdiction to determine the qualifications of its members').
139 See Douglas, ProceduralFairness, supra note 28, at 5-6 (noting that "virtually all state
constitutions, much like the U.S. Constitution, provide that each house shall be the judge of
its members' 'qualifications, elections and returns' ").
140 Id. at 6 (identifying two such states).
Perhaps some of these jurisdictions preclude
contests over state legislative races simply for policy reasons, rather than based on an
interpretation of the relevant state constitutional provision. However, many do so based on
the latter consideration. See, e.g., Carrington v. Human, 544 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Mo. 1976)
("[TMo determine the qualifications and election of members of the House of Representatives
after the general election [would be] in contravention of our Constitution....
141 Thorsness v. Daschle, 279 N.W.2d 166, 167-70 (S.D.
1979).
142 Whitaker, supranote 61, at 37-38.
143 See Thorsness, 279 N.W.2d at 168 (noting that Thomas's action in the House under the
FCEA was pending during the state court proceeding); id. at 171 (Morgan, J., dissenting)
(explaining that Daschle had already been seated unconditionally by the House).
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motion. The court explained why Article I, Section 5 posed no bar
to the proceedings:
There are two fundamental principles that must be
understood in order that there might be a proper
analysis of this case. First, there is the question
concerning who won the election, which necessarily
carries with it an inquiry into how the winner was
selected. Second, is the question concerning who will
be seated as the First District Representative of South
Dakota in the United States House of Representatives.
The
These two questions are mutually exclusive.
questions "of who won" and the propriety of the
election procedure are purely matters of state law.
[citing Roudebush]. On the other hand, the question of
"who sits" is solely within the province of the United
States Congress. [citing, inter alia, Article I, Section
5].144

As a result of this dichotomy, the court held, the state court
proceedings could continue. 145
The decision by the South Dakota court forced Daschle to
defend his victory before both the state court and the House of
Representatives. Daschle prevailed first before the state supreme
court. On November 27, 1979, it dismissed the suit with an
opinion declaring that Daschle had "won" the election.1 46 Several
months later, the House of Representatives followed suit,
dismissing Thorsness's election contest. 14 7 In the accompanying
report, submitted by the Committee on House Administration, the
Committee indicated that it found the parallel state court
proceedings to be helpful. 14 8 It included in its report a full copy of

Id. at 168.
Id.; see also id. at 170 ('The possibility that Congress may decide to make its own
investigation and determination apart from the judgment of the state court and the fact
that Congress has the final authority to make such determination do not constitute a bar to
the enforcement of state procedures designed to insure the legal outcome of its elections.").
("We determine that
146 See Thorsness v. Daschle, 285 N.W.2d 590, 590 (S.D. 1979)
Daschle won.").
147 H.R. RES. 576, 96th Cong. (1980).
148 See H.R. REP. No. 96-785, at 3 (1980) (discussing the usefulness of the state court's
review of the election to the Committee in making its decision).
144

145
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the South Dakota Supreme Court opinion dismissing Thorsness's
challenge, 149 and it went so far as to reprint the conclusion reached
by its Task Force that "[i]n light of the exhaustive de novo recount
by South Dakota's highest Court, it would seem both redundant
and presumptuous for this panel to recount the ballots ourselves
and substitute our judgment for the court[']s." 5 0
This endorsement of the state court proceedings is consistent
with signals sent from both Houses of Congress, as discussed in
Part 11.151
It also is consistent with the constitutional
interpretation reached by the South Dakota Supreme Court. 152
And it is, as noted, the majority position on the question of Article
I, Section 5.153 It nevertheless elicited a dissent in the South
Dakota Supreme Court, 154 and it is in tension with the positions
adopted in the federal courts. 15 5 It is, moreover, flatly contrary to

the conclusions reached in other states.
B. REFUSING TO PROVIDE ANY JUDICIAL RECOURSE AT ALL

In the second category of legal regimes, the states do not allow
their courts to adjudicate congressional election contests. Often,
the lack of authorization is grounded explicitly in the state's
interpretation of Article I, Section 5. Texas provides an example.
In Texas, the state supreme court was asked to adjudicate a
disputed congressional election between Robert Alton Gammage
and Ron Paul. 156 After a close race, Paul instituted an election

14 Id. at 2.
150 Id. at 3. The Task Force continued: "While we certainly have the authority, we find no
reason to exercise it." Id. The Committee described this Task Force as a three-person Ad
Hoc Election Panel. Id. at 1.
161 See supra Section II.c.
152 See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
153 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
15 See Thorsness v. Daschle, 279 N.W.2d 166, 170 (S.D. 1979) (Morgan, J., dissenting)
("How in the world can anyone argue that the questions 'who won the election?' and 'who
will be seated?' are mutually exclusive. It is purely an appeal to the provincial and
quixotic.").
155 More specifically, it is in tension with the determination by the federal courts that
Article I, Section 5 often precludes federal court adjudication. See supra Section II.B. The
federal courts are, of course, grappling with restraints-such as the justiciability
doctrines-that might not apply in a given state. See infra notes 301-05 and accompanying
text. The conclusion also is in tension with conclusions reached by the few scholars who
have addressed this question. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
156 Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1, 1 (Tex. 1977).
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contest pursuant to a Texas statute that granted jurisdiction to the
state district court " 'of all contests of elections, general or special,
for all . .. federal offices.'"157

Paul argued that this provision

included congressional election contests.15 8 The court rejected his
argument, deeming this provision "of the Texas Election Code, as
interpreted by Respondent Paul, [to be] in diametrical conflict with
and contrary to Article I, § 5, of the United States Constitution." 159
Basing its decision largely on its reading of Roudebush and other
judicial precedents, 160 the court indicated that Paul's exclusive
recourse was to petition the House itself.16 1
A number of states have reached conclusions consistent with
In at least six
this decision by the Texas Supreme Court.
additional states, state supreme courts have dismissed election
contests based expressly on the Article I, Section 5 mandate. 162
157 Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted) (quoting TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 9.01).
Id.
Id. at 3.
160 See id. at 2-5.
161 See id. at 4-5 (noting that the FCEA provides a "comprehensive procedure" for Paul to
pursue his contest). Texas's election contest regime is now governed by Title 14 of the
Election Code, which includes, as its first provision, the following: 'This title does not apply
to: (1) a general or special election for the office of United States senator or United States
representative. . . ." TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.001 (West 2016). Texas nevertheless has
allowed its courts to adjudicate an election contest concerning a congressional primary
election. See Rodriguez v. Cuellar, 143 S.W.3d 251, 256-57 (Tex. App. 2004).
162 See Burchell v. State Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 68 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Ky. 1934) ("By
article I, § 5, of the Federal Constitution, the power to pass upon the election and
qualification of its own members is vested exclusively in each house of Congress, and no
court has any authority to adjudicate upon that subject."); Laxalt v. Cannon, 397 P.2d 466,
467-68 (Nev. 1964) ("Art. I, § 5 of the United States Constitution invests the Senate of the
United States with the supreme and exclusive jurisdiction to judge the election contest here
presented."); see also Rogers v. Barnes, 474 P.2d 610, 612-13 (Colo. 1970) (noting that
"section 5 empowers Congress, and Congress alone, to determine charges of voting
irregularity, for example, stemming from a general election and concerning the offices of
United States Senator and member of the United States House of Representatives"); Young
v. Mikva, 363 N.E.2d 851, 853-54 (111. 1977) (concluding "that there is no statutory grant of
jurisdiction to [the state court] to hear and determine contests of elections of
Representatives in Congress" because "the Constitution gives Congress the exclusive
authority to judge the elections of its members"); Smith v. Polk, 19 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Ohio
1939) (dismissing House of Representatives election contest since Article I, Section 5 vests
exclusive jurisdiction in this House, and noting that a number of state courts had similarly
concluded); Sutherland v. Miller, 91 S.E. 993, 993-98 (W. Va. 1917) (holding that the state's
election contest statute unconstitutionally delegates power that Article I, Section 5 reserves
for the Houses of Congress); cf. State ex rel. Fleming v. Crawford, 10 So. 118, 121-22 (Fla.
1891) ("The constitution of the United States has not elsewhere given to this court the
power to pass upon the question of the legality of the election of United States senator, but
by the last of the provisions quoted above it has expressly excluded from it the right to do
158
159
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In a few states, the legislatures have responded to these
decisions by codifying the constitutionally inspired prohibition. In
Nevada, for example, the state legislature added the following
language (italicized here for purposes of identification) to its
election code only a year after its court dismissed as
unconstitutional a senatorial candidate's contest:
A candidate at any election, or any registered voter of
the appropriate political subdivision, may contest the
election of any candidate, except for the office of United
States Senator or Representative in Congress.163
It is, of course, possible that this amendment reflected
something other than the state supreme court's constitutional
determination. Yet the timing constitutes strong evidence of a
direct connection. This combination-a court decision followed by
a statutory amendment codifying that decision-puts the
jurisdiction in an uncomfortable position, as it now seems virtually
impossible for the Nevada Supreme Court to reconsider its
conclusion. Who would have standing to bring the suit? 164 In any

event, this statutory amendment placed Nevada among a minority

so."); LaCaze v. Johnson, 305 So. 2d 140, 146 (La. Ct. App. 1974) ('The forum for a
resolution of these issues is the United States House of Representatives."); Belknap v. Bd. of
Canvassers, 54 N.W. 376, 376-77 (Mich. 1893) (noting that the House of Representatives is
the sole judge of its elections, and because of this, the state's recount statute "had no
application" in this election contest); In re Williams' Contest, 270 N.W. 586, 587-88 (Minn.
1936) (stating that "Congress had not given to any state or to any court any authority
whatsoever" to judge congressional elections, and concluding, after a discussion of other
state courts' decisions in this area, that it had no jurisdiction to entertain this challenge);
Britt v. Bd. of Canvassers, 90 S.E. 1005, 1007 (N.C. 1916) (holding that Article I, Section 5
"withdraw[s] from the courts and vest[s] in Congress the power to pass on the title to the
office of Congressman"); In re Opinion to the Governor, 103 A. 513, 513 (R.I. 1918) ("Any
answer given by a court to the question now before us must be regarded as inconclusive
even as an advisory opinion; since the authoritative determination of this and like questions
is not within the jurisdiction of the court of last resort in any state in the Union. By the
Constitution of the United States, article I, section 5, the United States Senate is made the
sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its members."); State ex rel.
Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 24 N.W.2d 504, 507-09 (Wis. 1946) (stating that it is "well
established" that under Article I, Section 5 courts have no jurisdiction to judge election
contests and concluding that "[t]his court, therefore, cannot go behind the returns and
investigate frauds and mistakes, and adjudge which candidate was elected").
163 Assembly B. No. 431, 53d Sess., at 1229-30 (Nev. 1965) (enacted).
164 See Fergason v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 364 P.3d 592, 600-02 (Nev. 2015)
(addressing standing under Nevada law).
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of jurisdictions-including Kansas, 165 Ohio,1 66 and Texas1 67-that
have, through statute, expressly prohibited judicial adjudication of
congressional election contests. Ohio's prohibition is particularly
explicit, as it provides that no federal election shall be "subject to a
contest of election" conducted under the relevant chapter of the
Elections Code. 168 Rather, "[c]ontests of the nomination or election
of any person to any federal office shall be conducted in accordance
with the applicable provisions of federal law."

69

New Hampshire provides a distinct but similarly striking
example. This state allows a quasi-judicial review of election
contests by a five-member ballot law commission, 170 but it does not
allow judicial review of its decisions when the election in question
is congressional. The state identified its constitutional motivation
in the actual statutory text. More specifically, its statute provides
that the prohibition on judicial review exists "in view of the
of
houses
both
in
vesting
provisions
constitutional
and
congress . . exclusive jurisdiction over the elections
qualifications of their respective members." 17 1
Other regimes exclude congressional election contests not
through express statutory prohibition, but rather by implication.
In Alabama, for example, the constitution and statutory code set
forth provisions addressing election contests for a number of
offices, 172 but they do not include congressional elections. Similar
175
regimes govern in Illinois, 17 3 Kentucky,1 74 and West Virginia,
among others.

161 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1435 (West 2016) ("Any registered voter [to] contest the election
of any person for whom such voter had the right to vote,... except that the foregoing shall
not apply to the election of persons to the United States congress.").
166 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08 (West 2016).
167 TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.001 (West 2016). This amendment post-dated the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1977).
16
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08 (West 2016).
169

Id.

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:1(I) (West 2016).
§ 665:16.
172 See ALA. CODE § 17-16-40 (2016) (listing offices).
173 See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.1a-1.12a (West 2016) (detailing election contest
procedure).
174 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.155 (West current through 2016) (providing a contest
mechanism for candidates "for election to say state, county, district, or city office).
171 See W. VA. CODE § 3-7-1 to -9 (West 2016) (detailing the election contest procedure,
which does not include congressional elections).
170

171

Id.
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In short, in this second category of legal regimes-which
encompasses around a dozen states1 76-the state courts will not
adjudicate congressional election contests. This exists in stark
contrast with the regimes that govern in the majority of states,1 7 7
which allow election contests to proceed notwithstanding the
command of Article I, Section 5. The result is a nationwide split
not over how to run an election (or, at least, not only over how to
run an election), but also over the meaning of the United States
Constitution. For while it is possible that something other than
constitutional analysis motivated some of the regimes that
prohibit congressional election contests, the connection is explicit
in some jurisdictions,1 78 and in others it seems highly likely that
the constitutional command played a part. 179 For every one of
these jurisdictions that has concluded that Article I, Section 5
prohibits state court adjudication, another jurisdiction has reached
precisely the opposite conclusion.1 8 0
This divide ensures an
inconsistent regime across the country-and in the jurisdictions
adopting the minority position, it leaves potential challengers with
no judicial recourse at all. Given that the federal courts almost
certainly will refuse to hear these sorts of claims, 181 potential
litigants in this second category of states stand before a barricade
of closed courthouse doors.
C. SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE

In a small number of jurisdictions, the states seek to have it
both ways: to respect the prohibition they feel is imposed by the
Article I, Section 5 mandate while also permitting judicial
resolution of disputed congressional elections. The result in these
176 Although unsettled case law and changing election codes makes it difficult to
categorize jurisdictions in a definitive manner, fourteen states appear, at the time of
publication of this Article, to fall into this category: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Ohio, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Texas, Virginia, and
West Virginia.
177 See supra Section III.A.
178 See, e.g., supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text (describing statutory regime in
New Hampshire); see also supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text (describing case law
in Texas and Nevada).
179 See, e.g., supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text (describing statutory regime in
Ohio); cf. supra notes 163-65, 167 and accompanying text (identifying statutory regimes in
Nevada, Kansas, and Texas).
180 See supra Section III.A.
181 See supra Section II.B.
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jurisdictions is a hybrid regime twisting to comply with what each
state thinks the United States Constitution requires.
Perhaps the starkest example of this regime can be found in
Minnesota, which provides a special set of rules for congressional
election contests. The regime is so unusual that it is worth
reading the statute itself. It provides:
When a contest relates to the office of senator or a
member of the house of representatives of the United
States, the only question to be decided by the court is
which party to the contest received the highest number
of votes legally cast at the election and is therefore
entitled to receive the certificate of election. The judge
trying the proceedings shall make findings of fact and
conclusions, of law upon that question. Evidence on
any other points specified in the notice of contest,
including but not limited to the question of the right of
any person to nomination or office on the ground of
deliberate, serious, and material violation of the
provisions of the Minnesota Election Law, must be
taken and preserved by the judge trying the contest, or
by some person appointed by the judge for that
purpose; but the judge shall make no findings or
conclusion on those points. 182
The statute then provides where all the unheard evidence relating
to that second set of claims should go: "to the presiding officer of
the Senate or the House of Representatives of the United
States." 183
This bifurcated regime, and its history, implies a struggle with
the meaning of Article I, Section 5. The Minnesota statute was
first enacted in 1963, in apparent response to a decision that same

182

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.12 (West 2016).

183 Id. ("After the time for appeal has expired, or in case of an appeal, after the final

judicial determination of the contest, upon application of either party to the contest, the
court administrator of the district court shall promptly certify and forward the files and
records of the proceedings, with all the evidence taken, to the presiding officer of the Senate
or the House of Representatives of the United States. The court administrator shall
endorse on the transmittal envelope or container the name of the case and the name of the
party in whose behalf the proceedings were held, and shall sign the endorsement.").
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year by the Minnesota Supreme Court. 184 Prior to this decision,
the Minnesota Supreme Court had suggested, in a series of cases,
that the United States Constitution prohibited the adjudication of
congressional election contests.1 8 5
In 1963, however, the
Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed a congressional election
contest not on constitutional grounds, but rather based on its
conclusion that the court lacked statutory jurisdiction.18 6
In
concurring opinions, multiple Justices indicated that while they
interpreted Article I, Section 5 to pose some restrictions on state
court proceedings, they nevertheless interpreted it to permit a
limited form of judicial review.1 8 7
The legislature appears to have responded to this decision by
enacting a statute tracking the constitutional line articulated in
the concurring opinions.1 88 Decades later, the Minnesota Supreme
Court had the opportunity to consider whether the statute in
question did, indeed, comply with Article I, Section 5. Leaning
heavily on the United State Supreme Court's holding in
Roudebush, the state supreme court concluded that Minnesota's
adjudicative regime did not violate the United States
Constitution.1 89

The intuition reflected in Minnesota's unusual statutory
regime-which permits court adjudication, but only of a limited
See Odegard v. Olson, 119 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. 1963).
See In re Youngdale, 44 N.W.2d 459, 462 (Minn. 1950) ("It is clear that our courts have
no jurisdiction over the election of representatives to congress, but that congress is its own
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members."); In re Williams' Contest,
270 N.W. 586 (Minn. 1936) (dismissing election contest for lack of jurisdiction); State ex rel.
25 Voters v. Selvig, 212 N.W. 604, 604 (Minn. 1927) (concluding that Article I, Section 5
"gives the House of Representatives exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the
respondent is or is not disqualified from becoming a member of that body").
188 See Odegard, 119 N.W.2d at 720 (dismissing an election contest after "carefully
examining these statutory provisions").
187 See id. at 721-22 (Knutson, C.J., concurring) (arguing that the state can engage in
certain review procedures of congressional elections, such as recounts, without violating
Article I, Section 5); id. at 722-23 (Rogosheske, J., concurring specially) (concurring in the
judgment that the court could not entertain this challenge, but arguing that this was due to
a lack of statutory authorization, not a constitutional restriction).
188 This statute was substantively identical to the one reprinted above. See supra note
182 and accompanying text; see also MINN. STAT. § 204.32 (repealed 1975) (containing
similar language as § 209.12).
189 See Franken v. Pawlenty, 762 N.W.2d 558, 569-70 (Minn. 2009) (holding that
Minnesota's statutory regime did not usurp the Senate's constitutional authority because
the Constitution does not require the presentation of a state-issued certificate of election for
the Senate to seat a member).
184

18
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nature, in congressional elections-is reflected in other
authorities. In an older case out of Wisconsin, for example, the
court concluded that Article I, Section 5 did not allow a court to "go
behind the returns and investigate and correct frauds and
mistakes, and adjudge which of the candidates was elected" but
that a court nevertheless could address a narrower issue: whether
the board of state canvassers should have counted certain votes.1 90
Like the statute in Minnesota, this Wisconsin decision preserves
the adjudication of some questions exclusively for each House of
Congress. Given its reliance on Article I, Section 5, the decision by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court also provides further evidence that
this sort of limitation does not necessarily reflect the state's policy
preferences, but instead reflects the state's understanding of
federal law.
A
similarly
nuanced-but
substantively
distinctinterpretation of Article I, Section 5 also might have motivated the
statutory regime in Connecticut, which distinguishes between, on
the one hand, contests over federal elections, 19 1 and, on the other,
contests over elections for state offices.1 9 2 Although the two
Connecticut provisions are in many respects identical, the
differences are telling. For the state races, the tribunal's decision
is "final and conclusive" unless it is appealed. 193 For federal races,
by contrast, the tribunal's decision is merely "final," and it cannot
be appealed.1 94 This bifurcated regime in Connecticut joins others
that give special treatment to congressional election contests. 195

190 State ex rel. McDill v. Bd. of State Canvassers, 36 Wis. 498, 505 (1874).
191 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323 (West 2016) (addressing both congressional

elections and elections for presidential electors).
192 See id. § 9-324 (addressing elections for state offices as well as for probate judges).
193

Id.

Id. § 9-323. The tribunals are also different. For federal races, the complaint is filed
before a panel of three state supreme court justices. Id. For the state races, the complaint
is filed before a single superior court judge. Id. § 9-324.
199 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 60.0-.7 (West 2016) (specially selected five-member court
and other provisions for federal elections); 25 PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3401, 3405
(West 2016) (special venue and other provisions for contested congressional elections); cf.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-801(b) (West 2016) (providing that contests for U.S. Senate be heard
in the same venue as other statewide election contests); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 258.036
(West 2016) (providing that federal election contests, along with a number of other specified
elections, be heard in same venue as the state capital). In Michigan, the state has not
enacted special provisions for the adjudication of congressional election contests, but it has
empowered its courts to help protect evidence (and more specifically ballots) "[wihenever a
contest for the office of congressman is in progress before the house of representatives" or
19
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To varying degrees, these states' regimes seem to reflect
concerns-either constitutional or policy-related-over the Article
I, Section 5 mandate, and they confirm the depth of the conflict
over the meaning of this federal provision. They also help to
reveal the stakes. Suffering from a profound lack of consensus over
its scope and meaning, Article I, Section 5 has affected (and,
arguably, distorted) state court procedure throughout the country.
IV. DAMAGE ACROSS THE SYSTEM

The interpretive vacuum of Article I, Section 5-a phenomenon
produced by the federal government's failure to clarify the
constitutional line-has produced a confusing and conflicting
jumble of state law regimes. This Part exposes the harm caused
by this deep and entrenched split. It begins by offering a unifying
theory of the difficult constitutional provision that has caused the
split. As Section IV.A explains, Article I, Section 5 is best
understood to empower each House of Congress, as "the Judge" of
congressional elections, to decide the extent to which court
adjudication may play a part. Pursuant to this theory of Article I,
Section 5, court adjudication currently is permissible. This is
because, though neither House of Congress has spoken definitively
on this question, neither affirmatively has resolved to oust courts
from the process, and reports issued by committees in both Houses
have embraced court adjudication. These subtle signals should be
interpreted as Congress's tacit approval of court adjudication of
congressional election contests.
Yet many jurisdictions have not embraced this understanding.
And Congress has not acted to clarify its position. The result, as
explained in Section IV.B, is an assortment of harms. At the
outset, election contests are defined by uncertainty and
unpredictability. Potential challengers, as well as the jurisdictions
themselves, lack clarity with respect to where or how to adjudicate
their disputes. This, in turn, leads to the potential for partisan
An additional set of harms
manipulation and illegitimacy.
emerges from the ad hoc nature of the procedural analysis, which
leads to suboptimal forms of adjudication. In some jurisdictions,
the Senate. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.150 (West 2016) (detailing procedures for
the House); id. § 168.109 (detailing procedure for the Senate); see also Douglas, Procedural
Fairness,supranote 28, at 10, 29 (discussing Michigan's regime).
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this ad hoc regime translates into a complete lack of judicial
recourse for those seeking review. In others, it results in warped
Across the country, when states do adjudicate
procedure.
disputes, they often do so in a manner that risks interference with
the adjudication of either House of Congress, including through
disruptive delay.
Lurking in the background, amid this
cacophony, is the threat of a political-or even constitutionalcrisis.
A. THE ANSWER TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

The split across the country over Article I, Section 5 confirms
that its meaning is not self-evident. Yet the standard tools of
constitutional interpretation-tools that look to the text of the
provision, the structure of the Constitution, historical practice, and
decisions from the federal courts-all point to the same
conclusion. 196 And this conclusion helps to explain why the
confusion persists in the first place. This is because Article I,
Section 5 is best understood to empower Congress with respect to
the procedural questions it poses. Stated otherwise, it grants to
each House of Congress the authority to decide whether and how
to limit adjudication, judicial or otherwise. (Whether this power is
bicameral or unicameral in nature is an important but distinct
issue, which is addressed in more detail below.197) These same
tools of constitutional interpretation also help to resolve the
quandary that arises when either House of Congress simply has
Namely, in the absence of a clear ouster of
failed to act.
jurisdiction by either House of Congress, the courts may
adjudicate.198

One might begin with the text. Article I, Section 5, as relevant,
reads that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members." 99 The provision

196 As discussed below,
an inquiry into original intent, which represents another
analytical approach, is inconclusive. See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
197 See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
19s It is true that one could adopt the opposite presumption-that in the absence of a clear
grant of jurisdiction by either House of Congress, the courts may not adjudicate. As
discussed below, however, the better understanding, given the context of this particular
issue, is the one more accommodating of court adjudication. See infra notes 217-18 and
accompanying text.
199 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
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deems each House to be "the Judge," not "a Judge," and it insists
that it "shall" judge, not merely that it "may."20 0 The emphasized
language confirms that the Constitution vests plenary authority
over these adjudications to each House of Congress-it is a
"textually demonstrable constitutional commitment." 2 01 Implicit
in that authority is the power to determine the extent to which
parallel proceedings may occur in the courts. While this language
might be read to indicate that Congress is the exclusive judgeand, as a result, that no other judge (or court) should be
participating in the process at a11202-this reading relies on a
cabined view of what a judge may and must do. Judges may rely
on other adjudicative agents and bodies when resolving disputes.
Article III judges, for example, may rely on the work of magistrate
judges while still retaining ultimate authority over the dispute. 203
Similarly, the language of Article I, Section 5, properly understood,
allows either House of Congress to rely on the work of a court
while still retaining ultimate authority over whom it will seat in
its chamber. 20 4
The better understanding of the constitutional text, then, is
that it really does grant plenary power to each House of Congress
over the relevant adjudication-and, that being the case, that it

Id. (emphasis added).
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (noting that a "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment" of an issue to a coordinate political branch may prompt a court
to conclude that it constitutes a political question); see also Morgan v. United States, 801
F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that "it is difficult to imagine a clearer case of
'textually demonstrable Constitutional commitment' of an issue to another branch of
government to the exclusion of the courts" than in the language of Article I Section 5
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
202 Cf. Morgan, 801 F.2d at 447 ("The exclusion of others-and in particular of others who
are judges-could not be more evident.").
203 See generally United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). The Constitution also
requires that the federal courts, in certain circumstances, rely on juries. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VII.
204 An interesting constitutional question is presented if either House of Congress tried to
delegate entirely its authority to make this ultimate determination. It is not clear whether
the Constitution would allow Congress to bind itself to another institution's ruling. The
currently toothless nature of a related doctrine-the nondelegation doctrine-would provide
some support for the constitutionality of this approach. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding
that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad
general directives."). This said, the constitutionality and wisdom of Congress taking such a
bold (and politically unrealistic) step is beyond the scope of this Article.
200
201
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grants to each House of Congress the power to determine the
extent to which parallel court proceedings may go forward.
This understanding of Article I, Section 5 comports with the
structure set up by its accompanying provision: Article I, Section 4.
The latter provision, often referred to as the Elections Clause,
provides:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing
Senators. 20 5
This clause strikes a careful balance between the federal and state
governments. More specifically, it requires that each state hold
congressional elections-but that each do so subject to overriding
direction by Congress. 20 6 This regime, with its primary reliance on
each state's electoral procedures and mechanisms, is very difficult
to reconcile with an understanding of Article I, Section 5 that
uniformly prohibits any adjudication by the state courts. In part,
this is because no bright line separates administrative proceedings
(which Section 4 clearly allows, and may even require) from
judicial proceedings. 20 7 More fundamentally, a highly restrictive
view of Article I, Section 5 produces a regime whereby Congress is
prohibited from relying on state court proceedings even if it wishes
to do so. This betrays the balance struck by Article I, Section 4. It
pulls authority away from the state right as the state is likely to
be of assistance in resolving the most challenging of elections. A
more harmonious reading of the two provisions is the one that
empowers Congress to determine the degree to which parallel
proceedings may continue.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2672
(2015) ("The dominant purpose of the Elections Clause, the historical record bears out, was
to empower Congress to override state election rules, not to restrict the way States enact
legislation."); see also id. ("[T]he Clause was the Framers' insurance against the possibility
that a State would refuse to provide for the election of representatives to the Federal
Congress." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
207 Cf. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 21 (1972) (attempting to parse this distinction).
This line appears even fuzzier once one recognizes that state law may draw the line
differently than federal law. Id.
205
206
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This "empowering" interpretation of Article I, Section 5 finds
further support in historical practice. More specifically, it is
consistent with how the two Houses of Congress have responded to
state court adjudication of congressional election contests. As
discussed above, committees in both the House and the Senate
expressly have relied on findings of courts, and at times they have
gone so far as to suggest that exhaustion of state judicial remedies
may be necessary to prevail in an election contest before either
House. 208 Neither appears ever to have attempted to prevent court
proceedings. Historically, in short, each House has embraced state
court adjudication of congressional election contests. It is true
that this approach is consistent not only with the empowerment
theory of Article I, Section 5, but also with a different theory:
namely, one that understands Article I, Section 5 to grant wide
latitude to the states regardless of congressional intent. Yet the
power accorded by Article I, Section 4-a sweeping authority
allowing Congress to regulate congressional electionS 209-would
seem to foreclose the latter interpretation.
With respect to a related historical question-namely, how
original understanding informs the debate-probative evidence
appears lacking. 2 10 The dearth of evidentiary insight may be
because election-related litigation was rare, if not nonexistent,
during that time. 2 11 Indeed, according to Professor Edward Foley,
208 See supra notes
115, 117, 124 and accompanying text (describing exhaustion
requirement occasionally cited in either House's committee reports); see generally supra
Section II.c.
209 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
210 Writing during his tenure on the D.C. Circuit, Justice Scalia explained
as follows:
"There was no opposition to the Elections Clause in the Federal Constitutional
Convention,. . . and the minor opposition in the ratification debates focused upon the
clause's removal of final authority not from the courts, but from the state legislatures,
where the Articles of Confederation had vested an analogous power." Morgan v. United
States, 801 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). It is telling, moreover, that as
early as 1805, the House was internally split with respect to the scope of the Article I,
Section 5 power. At issue were the rules by which to judge the returns of an election out of
Georgia. See 8 THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE 633 (Francis Preston Blair & John C. Rives
eds., 1840) (describing the contested 1804 House election in Georgia between Cowles Mead
and Thomas Spalding, in which the House rejected the returns provided by the state
governor and decided to count previously excluded votes).
211 See Morgan, 801 F.2d at 447-48 (discussing the absence of litigation on the issue).
According to Professor Foley, 'The expectation of the Founding Generation had been that
conventional courts would have no authority to adjudicate these political disputes." FOLEY,
supra note 59, at 76; see also Morgan, 801 F.2d at 447 (suggesting that the safeguard of
judicial review was "evidently unthinkable").
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it was not until decades after ratification that the judiciary became
involved at all in the adjudication of election contests. 212
In short, looking to original intent for an answer to the Article I,
Section 5 question does not resolve the debate. But it also does not
undermine the conclusion that Article I, Section 5 means to
empower each House of Congress to determine the permissibility
of parallel court proceedings.
Another persuasive analytical approach-perhaps less relevant
than usual in this context, given the federal courts' reticence on
the subject-looks to doctrinal authority. Here, the weight of
authority supports the empowerment understanding of Article I,
Section 5. In part this is because the few on-point federal court
precedents that exist all seem to permit state court
Roudebush is perhaps the most significant
adjudication. 2 13
Although the dispute in that case was over an
example.
administrative recount rather than a judicial proceeding, the
the state proceedings
Court's primary concern-whether
an independent final
make
"frustrate[] the Senate's ability to
judgment"-would seem to allow room for judicial proceedings as
well.

2 14

In addition, in a case such as McIntyre, the federal court
assumed, in dicta, that the state courts have wide latitude in
adjudicating congressional election contests-and accordingly it
remanded the case to the state courts for further proceedings. 2 15
Coupled with the federal courts' repeated insistence that Congress
enjoys plenary authority in the context of congressional election
contests, the most reasonable understanding of McIntyre is that it
embraces the empowerment approach. 216

.

212 See FOLEY, supra note 59, at 76 (explaining that the judiciary began to fill the
"institutional vacuum" for vote counting disputes as the second party system matured); see
also id. at 74 ("[N]either Madison individually nor the Foundation Generation collectively
adopted a remedy for the problem of two-party conflict over statewide ballot-counting
disputes. This problem had caught them by surprise. .
213 See supra Section II.B.
214 Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25 (1972).
215 McIntyre v. Fallahay, 766 F.2d 1078, 1084, 1087 (7th Cir. 1985).
216 Language offered in dicta in other cases further supports the empowerment approach.
As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia explained in a case addressing the
Senate's duties of impeachment, "Since Powell and Roudebush, this court has refused to
entertain objections not only to the substance but also to the procedures used by the House
of Representatives in the exercise of its ballot-counting authority under Art. I, § 5, cl. 1."
Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aff'd by Nixon v. United States,
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In short, the best understanding of Article I, Section 5 is that it
empowers each House of Congress to limit (or not to limit) the
involvement of the courts.
The reasoning outlined above is, of course, more compelling as
it relates to the state courts than to the federal courts. This is
because many of the conclusions identified above-including those
relating to structure, history, and doctrine-specifically relate to
the state courts and do not necessarily extend in the same way to
the federal courts. With respect to the Constitution's structure, for
example, Article I, Section 4 does not rely on federal election
apparatuses in the same way it relies on state election
apparatuses. With respect to history and doctrine, federal courts
have taken a different approach than many state courts toward
their own jurisdiction, as the federal courts generally have refused
to hear congressional election contests. As a result of these
distinctions, it is easier to conclude that Article I, Section 5
accommodates state court adjudication than it is to conclude that
the provision accommodates federal court adjudication.
This nevertheless seems to be the correct result. Largely, this
is due to a distinct set of arguments. Namely, Article I, Section 5
empowers and protects Congress; it does not purport to limit the
tools normally available to this body. And among its goals is to
empower and protect Congress against the possibility of state
obstruction. 2 17 Given these features, it would be curious indeed if
this provision tacitly required that any court adjudication take
place in the state courts.
Separate constitutional provisions,
including those limiting the reach of the federal courts, might pose
separate constitutional concerns. 2 18 It nevertheless is difficult to
understand why this provision-Article I, Section 5-would allow
Congress to rely on state court proceedings but prohibit it from
relying on federal court proceedings. As a result, Article I, Section
5 is best understood as accommodating both.
If the conclusion this Article reaches is correct, a complexity
arises. Namely, if the Constitution does indeed empower each
506 U.S. 224 (1993); see also In re Voorhis, 291 F. 673, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Hand, J.)
("Again, the House is the exclusive judge of the 'elections, returns and qualifications of its
own members.' Assuming that the ancillary power to perpetuate testimony must have the
sanction of Congress, clearly it is the House alone which must on the contest, as a court,
determine whether the procedure so created has been regularly followed.").
217 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying
text.
218 See infra notes 301-05 and accompanying
text.

2017]

JUDGING CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

405

House of Congress to decide the extent to which court adjudication
may take place, what happens if the Houses simply have failed to
articulate their decisions? 219 As discussed above, this is the
situation each jurisdiction, candidate, and interested observer now
faces. 220 Determining how to resolve this quandary is difficult.
However, looking to the factors discussed above leads to a
Namely, in this particular context,
reasonable conclusion.
Congress's silence on the subject should be construed as tacit
approval of court adjudication-or, at least, of state court
adjudication. This is true when one looks both to the historical
practices of each House of Congress (including the language in
committee reports expressly relying on and supportive of state
court adjudication) and to the case law (which does not include
precedents enjoining state court proceedings).
In short, Article I, Section 5 is best understood to vest in each
House of Congress the authority to determine whether courts may
Although neither
adjudicate congressional election contests.
House of Congress has spoken definitively on the subject, silence
in this particular context should be interpreted as tacit approval.
It is true that these conclusions diverge from the conclusions
reached by a number of courts and the few scholars who have
spoken on the subject. 2 21 However, this Article concludes that the
219 There is an argument that this failure to decide is itself unconstitutional.
In other
words, by failing to articulate the Article I, Section 5 line, Congress may be
unconstitutionally abdicating its affirmative responsibility to "judge" the elections of its
members. Even if this understanding of Article I, Section 5 were correct, however, a claim
raising such an argument would almost certainly be nonjusticiable. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (explaining that the presence of a textually demonstrable commitment
to a coordinate political branch can render an issue a nonjusticiable political question); see
also Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting Article I, Section
5's clear textual commitment to Congress).
220 See supra Section II.c.
221 See supra Section II.B; see also supra note 28 (identifying the few scholars who have
explored these issues even tangentially). It contradicts, for example, the conclusion reached
by Kristen R. Lisk, who has written what appears to be one of the only scholarly works
directly addressing the question. See Lisk, supra note 28, at 1228 (arguing that "exclusive
Congressional resolution of substantive claims for relief in congressional election contests is
necessary in light of constitutional test" and that an interpretation barring substantive relief
in state courts is preferable); see also Muller, supra note 28, at 595 (citing Lisk note for similar
conclusion). Lisk's work is insightful and informative. However, it focuses more on policyrelated argumentation than on constitutional analysis, and it does not consider the idea that
Article I, Section 5 empowers each House of Congress to determine the involvement of court
adjudication. This Article's conclusions also are in tension with those reached by Paul E.
Salamanca and James E. Keller. See Salamanca & Keller, supra note 28, at 365-83
(criticizing a Kentucky Supreme Court decision, which construed an analogous state
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decisions reached to the contrary-including in states such as
Texas, Ohio, and Nevada 2 22-are wrong. Unfortunately, many of
these decisions are effectively unreviewable, given that the state
legislatures have codified the state court opinions by stripping
jurisdiction over congressional election contests from their
courts. 2 23 In any event, these jurisdictions are not alone in causing
problems. To the contrary, jurisdictions across the country are
grappling unsuccessfully with the inadequately addressed
question of Article I, Section 5's reach, 2 24 and the result is harm
across the system.
B. THE COSTS OF RELYING ON AN UNCERTAIN, PATCHWORK REGIME

Congress's failure to clarify the Article I, Section 5 line
undermines values fundamental to an effective and legitimate
system of adjudication. 22 5 It undermines these values because it
has produced an uncertain, patchwork regime for the adjudication
of congressional election contests.
At the outset, the uncertainty itself creates problems. This
uncertainty stems from the unclear messages emanating from
Congress, as well as the mixed messages characterizing the
various state regimes. These combine to produce a rule whereby,
in the context of congressional election disputes, it is not clear
whether state court adjudication is allowed or prohibited-or
perhaps even required, given the exhaustion principle occasionally
advanced in congressional committee reports. 226
Legal uncertainty of this sort is frequently problematic; it can
lead to inefficiencies and the risk of manipulation by savvy
lawyers. It is particularly problematic, moreover, in the context of
election disputes, where even the appearance of partisan
manipulation of the rules can so directly undermine legitimacy

constitutional provision to allow the court to entertain an election contest). The SalamancaKeller article nevertheless addresses a distinct set of concerns: those that arise when a court
purports to enjoin a candidate from serving in a legislative body. Id. at 362.
222 See supra Section 11I.B.
223 See supra notes 163-75 and accompanying text.
224 See supra Part Ill (discussing the depth and breadth of the split across the states).
225 As discussed in more detail below, these include values such as impartiality,
appearance of impartiality, accuracy, and timeliness. See infra Section V.A.
226 See supra notes
115, 117, 124 and accompanying text (describing exhaustion
requirement occasionally cited in either House's committee reports).
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regarding the election itself. 227 In this context, party affiliations

contribute to the problem. When a candidate, aligned with a
political party, is able to exploit ambiguity in the law to increase
the odds of appearing before a judge also aligned with that same
political party (or vice versa), that dynamic can lead to the
appearance of judicial partiality-and perhaps actual partiality. 228
The costs of uncertainty are most acute in jurisdictions that
have wavered on the question of the reach of Article I, Section 5.
In Colorado, for example, a state statute permits the adjudication
of congressional election contests. 229 Yet in 1970, the state
supreme court held this provision unconstitutional, citing Article I,
Section 5.230 Two decades later, the same court called that prior
holding into question-but without formally overruling it.231 A
similar vacillation defines the regime in California, where the
statutes also permit state court adjudication-but where the
courts have offered competing visions of the constitutionality of
this jurisdictional grant. 232 The uncertainty that characterizes
this area of the law, across the country and certainly in these
particular jurisdictions, creates an opportunity for gamesmanship
at the cost of legitimacy and impartiality. 2 33
The failure by Congress to clarify the Article I, Section 5 line
produces more than just uncertainty. It also results in reliance on
an ad hoc, state-based set of legal regimes to resolve disputes over
227 See Saul Zipkin, Administering Election Law, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 641, 647-60 (20112012) (discussing the impact that even the appearance of partisan self-dealing can have on
the democratic legitimacy of an election).
228 See, e.g., FOLEY, supra note 59, at 258-59, 267-78 (describing questionable rulings by
the Alabama Supreme Court over a disputed election for Chief Justice of that same body);
see also id. at 347 (referring to the "egregious decision" of the Rhode Island Supreme Court
in 1956 as an example of partisan manipulation).
229 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-11-201 (West 2016).
230 See Rogers v. Barnes, 474 P.2d 610, 612-13 (Colo. 1970) (concluding that the statute,
"as it applies to the parties here before this Court, is held to be in conflict with Article I,
Section 5 of the United States Constitution and in such situation the United States
Constitution must prevail").
231 See Meyer v. Lamm, 846 P.2d 862, 871 n.10 (Colo. 1993) ("Rogers was decided before
and without benefit of Roudebush v. Hartke. . ., and we believe that the holding in Rogers
should not be extended.").
232 See Jacobson v. Bilbray, No. D049407, 2007 WL 824450, at *1, *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar.
20, 2007) (suggesting that it disagreed with the trial court over the question of Article I,
Section 5's reach); see also supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
233 See Lisa Marshall Manheim, RedistrictingLitigation and the Delegation of Democratic
Design, 93 B.U. L. REV. 563, 612-13 (2013) (discussing litigant gamesmanship and its
consequences in the context of redistricting litigation).
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federal elections.
Stated otherwise, it permits a patchwork
regime, unregulated by Congress, to govern this fundamental
question of United States governance. The problems with this
approach vary by jurisdiction. In some, the federally unregulated
regime results in no judicial recourse at all for those alleging
election error. This strips jurisdiction from precisely those who
need it the most: potential contestants who are concerned that
going straight into either House of Congress will ensure an
inappropriately quick dismissal. One example of a candidate in
this circumstance came out of a close contest between Paul Laxalt
and Howard W. Cannon, who were neck-and-neck after a tight
race in Nevada for United States Senator. Laxalt sought to
challenge the forty-eight-vote margin in Nevada state court, but
Nevada refused to hear the case, citing Article I, Section 5.234
Laxalt did not pursue recourse in the Senate 2 35-presumably
because, as a Republican without either an election certificate or a
successful state court challenge on his side, he did not expect a
reasonable chance of success.
On the flip side are contestees, dragged into court, hoping that
a favorable judicial ruling will help defend their presumptive
victory before a hostile House of Congress. The difference between
two 1974 senatorial elections-one in Oklahoma (which allowed
judicial proceedings) and New Hampshire (which did not)-help to
illustrate this dynamic. At the time, Democrats controlled the
Senate. 2 36 In each of the two races, the Republican candidate
appeared to have won the election. 2 37 In response, each of the
Democratic candidates challenged the results through state
processes as well as before the Senate itself. 238 The state regime

each candidate encountered, however, was different.
In
Oklahoma, the dispute went all the way up to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, which determined that the Republican had won
the election. 239 After an admittedly long delay, 240 the Democrat-

controlled Senate likewise determined that the Republican had

234
235
236
237

Laxalt v. Cannon, 397 P.2d 466, 467-68 (Nev. 1964).
FOLEY, supra note 59, at 250.

Id.
Id.

238

See id. at 250-56 (detailing the election contests).

239

Id. at 254.

240

See id. (describing the delay).
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won the election-"an issue no nonpartisan tribunal ever would
have considered in doubt after the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
ruling," and a resolution the Senate felt compelled to reach in part
2 41
due to the "fairness" of those state court proceedings.
In New Hampshire, by contrast, judicial appeals were not
available. Instead, the most definitive resolution was through the
state's Ballot Law Commission, a three-member board with
authority to resolve any recount-related issues that, at the time,
was composed of two Republicans and one Democrat-and that
was widely regarded as partisan. 24 2 After this Commission
reached a decision in the Republican's favor, the Senate simply
refused to seat the apparent winner. 24 3 What resulted was "a test
of partisan power, loyalty, and stamina," 244 with the stalemate
finally breaking when the candidates, nine months after the
original election day, agreed to participate in a new election. 245
While the experiences out of New Hampshire and Oklahoma
differed in a number of relevant ways, 246 the lack of a decision by
the New Hampshire courts surely did not help the Republican's
cause before an unwelcoming Senate. Court proceedings, in this
sense, help each House of Congress to adjudicate contests
notwithstanding the partisan pressures that pull so heavily.
This all said, the harm of relying on an inconsistent, ad hoc
regime for congressional election contests is not limited to the
It extends as well to
jurisdictions without judicial recourse.
jurisdictions such as Minnesota, which appears to have altered its
procedures (and thereby prohibited review of certain claims) in an
24 7
It
effort to comply with its view of the Article I, Section 5 line.

also extends to jurisdictions that adhere to the majority positionthat is, jurisdictions concluding that Article I, Section 5 poses no
substantial obstacle to court adjudication. 248 Indeed, the harm
241 Id. at 254, 255.

244

Id. at 251.
Id. at 252.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

245

Id.

242
243

On the merits, the challenger's arguments were stronger in the New Hampshire case.
See id. at 250-56 (describing the two sets of challenges). It also, ironically, took longer for
the Senate to resolve the Oklahoma case than it took to resolve the New Hampshire case.
See id. at 254-55 (stating that the Senate took approximately fifteen months to declare the
winner).
247 See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
248 See supra Section III.A.
246
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extends to every jurisdiction that permits judicial proceedings.
This is because Congress, by failing to speak on the question of
state court adjudication, also has failed to engage in any
regulation of these processes.
This potentially leads to
interference with the work of either House of Congress. This
interference might occur through delay, through the destruction of
evidence, or through any other means by which a parallel
proceeding can undermine either House's adjudication.
It is true that the Supreme Court has suggested that
interference with the work of either House is unconstitutional-or
more
specifically
that
state
election
procedures
are
unconstitutional

if they "frustrate[ ]

the . .. ability

[of either

House] to make an independent final judgment" on the question of
which candidate should be seated. 249 Yet that line has not been
policed as vigorously as it could be. This is perhaps most evident
with respect to the problem of delay. Delay in election contests is
a recurrent and difficult problem. To take one example, when the
Minnesota state courts resolved the election challenge brought by
Norm Coleman, it took nearly six months after the relevant
senatorial term had started before the state was willing to grant a
certificate of election to the winner, Al Franken. 2 50 As a result, the
Senate lacked full representation from Minnesota for nearly half a
year. 2 5 1 Similar examples-of election contests delaying the day
on which a politician begins work-can readily be found. 2 52 While
resolving disputes over elections inevitably takes time, 253 different
procedures tend to speed up or slow down the proceedings, and
each state adjudicating congressional elections has adopted its
own set of procedural rules. In some, such as Minnesota, there is
at least the potential for litigants to bring suit simply for the
Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25 (1972).
See WEINER, supra note 57, at 216-17, 219; see also FOLEY, supra note 59, at 332-33
("[O]n July 7, eight months after Election Day, Franken took the seat as Minnesota's junior
US Senator.").
251 As discussed below, while the Senate could have seated Senator Franken without an
election certificate, that would have run contrary to its own rules. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text; Franken v. Pawlenty, 762 N.W.2d 558, 570 (2009) (noting that the
Constitution did not prevent Senate from seating Franken without a certificate of election).
252 See, e.g., FOLEY, supra note 59, at 246 (discussing the 139-day delay between election
and inauguration in the 1962 Minnesota gubernatorial election).
253 Cf. id. at 306 ("Mhe decade after 2000 ...
cast serious doubt on the ability of even a
well-run state to resolve a disputed presidential election fairly and accurately within five
weeks.").
249

20
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purpose of delaying the seating of an election's winner. 25 4 Even if
the delay is not intentional, lengthy appeals processes (among
other things) can stretch out the proceedings. While either House,
of course, retains the authority to seat a candidate prior to the
resolution of a disputed election contest, 255 the practice in the

Senate in particular is to wait for a candidate to arrive with an
election certificate, 256 which in turn allows this sort of delay to
interfere with the workings of the federal government.
There are other interference-related risks stemming from state
court adjudication of congressional election contests. Allowing a
court to inspect and otherwise handle election-related evidence
raises concerns over the destruction of evidence. Election contests
often involve, for example, the inspection of ballots, where close
examination of small details may make a difference in the
outcome. 2 57 Disputes over the validity of absentee and provisional
ballots can, in turn, raise concerns over commingling of ballots,
which may as a practical matter preclude further legal
proceedings. 2 58 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's concern
over "preserving the integrity of the evidence" in such cases, 259 the
state courts have acted in an uneven manner in responding to
congressional concerns. 260
254 This potential arises in part because the statute provides that "[a]ny eligible voter"
may contest an election, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.02 (West 2016). If a voter wishes to delay
the seating of a disfavored politician, he or she could attempt to do so by bringing an
election contest and dragging out the proceedings as long as possible. Cf. Franken, 762
N.W.2d at 569-70 (discussing these provisions and acknowledging that pursuant to the
Senate's internal rules, the Senate normally will not seat a candidate without a certificate
of election).
255 Cf. id. at 570 ("[T]he Senate has authority to seat a Senator without a state-issued
certificate of election. . . .").
256 See supra note 254; see also WEINER, supra note 57, at 219 (describing the swearing in
of Senator Franken after resolution of the election contest in Minnesota); cf. Roudebush v.
Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 28 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ('The Senator-Elect to a seat in the
Senate generally appears with his credentials.").
257 See Foley, supra note 35, at 135 (describing the effort of contestant in a senatorial
election contest to introduce evidence with respect to 12,000 individual ballots); see also id.
(alluding to the "hanging chads" on individual ballots that were at issue in the presidential
election dispute between George W. Bush and Al Gore).
258 See id. at 152 (discussing the problems with challenging ballots once they are removed
from their envelopes and commingled with other ballots).
259 Roudebush, 405 U.S. at 18 (Douglas J., dissenting).
260 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 110-528, pt. 1, at 3 (2008) (describing resistance by Florida
courts to evidence-related requests by members of Congress); see also Thorsness v. Daschle,
279 N.W.2d 166, 168 (S.D. 1979) (insisting that "this state has the right to decide 'who won'
and determine the propriety of our election procedures" (emphasis added)).
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Finally, on a more fundamental level, there is the threat that
state court proceedings-if conducted in a biased or otherwise
improper manner-may undermine the legitimacy of subsequent
proceedings in either House of Congress.
Justice Scalia
articulated this concern when he stated (in another context) that
[t]he counting of votes that are of questionable legality
. . . threaten[s] irreparable harm to [a candidate], and
to the country, by casting a cloud upon what he claims
to be the legitimacy of his election. Count first, and
rule upon legality afterwards, is not a recipe for
producing election results that have the public
acceptance democratic stability requires. 26 1
Judge Easterbook, articulating similar concerns, has suggested
that some disputes "may have more to do with political advantage
than with legal rules," with "both sides . . . tempted to employ the
courts more to obtain publicity than to achieve justice." 2 62 In
particular, he observed, "[t]here is something unsettling about the
prospect of one person sitting in Congress while the other seeks an
advisory declaration in state courts that he 'really' won." 2 63
Such concerns are, of course, greatly reduced if the court
proceedings are run in a fair, efficient, and careful manner. This
further confirms the importance of designing a clear and sensible
set of procedures for disputed congressional elections-and the
costs of failing to do so.
A final cost of relying on the patchwork regime is Congress's
tacit acceptance of the absence of the federal courts. As discussed
above, 264 the federal courts largely have insisted on remaining
above the fray, which means that congressional elections receive
the benefit only of the state court system, and further that there is
the risk that issues of federal law will be resolved without the

261 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1047 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Although Bush v.
Gore does not provide significant insight into the meaning of Article I, Section 5, see supra
note 103, Justice Scalia's comments about the harm of misguided vote counting does extend
into the congressional context as well.
262 McIntyre v. Fallahay, 766 F.2d 1078, 1087 (7th Cir.
1985).
262 Id. The judge nevertheless remanded the case to the state courts,
explaining that the
political question doctrine did not bind the courts of Indiana. Id.
264 See supra Section II.B.
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opportunity for federal court review. 2 65 Moreover, one significant
difference between the state court systems and the federal court
system is that the former normally relies on elected judges. 26 6 The
concerns over the election of judges-not least of those relating to
partisanship-become magnified in the context of a disputed
election, where often some of the judges and the litigants will
share political parties. This can lead to accusations of partiality,
which already are rife in this context. At times, such accusations
may even appear accurate, as judges stretch to reach rulings that
Even
benefit candidates sharing their political affiliations. 267
when the accusations are unfounded, moreover, they call into
question the legitimacy of the proceedings.
All these problems combine to create a deeply problematic
regime that suffers from, among other things, the potential for
inaccurate proceedings, increased partiality (and appearance of
partiality), and delay. In many cases, the harm likely has been
irreparable; a better designed system might have produced a
different outcome in an election, 2 68 or allowed the candidate
properly seated (as well as the institution seating the candidate) to
enjoy increased legitimacy. 2 69 Still, in the face of all these harms,
the federal government has managed to muddle through. The
same may not be true going forward. The harms flowing from the
cacophony surrounding Article I, Section 5 have the potential to
Professor Foley
transform into a true constitutional crisis.
265 While it is true that litigants may seek Supreme Court review via certiorari from the
state court system, see 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012), such review presumably would be
unavailable if the Supreme Court concluded that the justiciability doctrines prohibited
federal courts from hearing the case. See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text
(describing this view of federal court jurisdiction); infra notes 301-05 and accompanying
text (discussing the possibility that the federal courts would refuse to accept jurisdiction
over congressional election contests even in response to a clear congressional grant of
authority).
266 See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 266
(2008) ("[R]oughly ninety percent of state general jurisdiction judges are currently selected
or retained [through popular election].").
267 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
268 See supra note 234 and accompanying text (describing the dispute between Paul Laxalt
and Howard W. Cannon, which never received a formal adjudication); supra notes 242-45
and accompanying text (describing the contest in New Hampshire, which never was
resolved).
269 See, e.g., supra note 59 and accompanying text (describing the seating of McCloskey
after the 1984 elections, in response to which the House Republicans walked out in protest);
infra note 283 and accompanying text (citing source suggesting that discord over this
election has led to dysfunction).
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describes such a scene emerging out of New Jersey in the mid1800s after New Jersey's entire congressional delegation was
In Professor Foley's words, "[c]haos
called into question. 2 70
reigned, exposing a flaw in the constitutional design." 27 1 Other
scenarios pose similarly dire concerns. 27 2 In short, the problems
currently associated with the Article I, Section 5 confusion are
significant. And they only hint at the harm that could be caused
going forward.
V. FILLING THE VOID

Article I, Section 5 empowers each House of Congress-and
More
each House of Congress should embrace this power.
specifically, Congress should enact legislation to clarify the reach
of Article I, Section 5.273 The nationwide split over the meaning of
this provision is deep and entrenched, and the effects of this
By exercising its power as the
uncertainty are widespread.
Congress has the ability not
elections,
of
congressional
"Judge"
only to cut through the confusion that dominates this area of the
law, but also to impose a far more predictable, consistent, and
sensible regime for the adjudication of congressional election
contests. Such improvement would help to fulfill the central

270 See FOLEY, supra note 59, at 87 (explaining that the New Jersey vote-counting dispute
involved the entire congressional delegation and, as a result, "ensnared Congress").
271 Id. at 88; see also id. at 92 (describing an "anarchic situation," with the House "in
paralysis"). This series of events often is referred to as the Broad Seal War. Id.
272 See, e.g., id. at 463 n.36 (identifying the particularly troubling problems posed if a
disputed congressional election--one that affects the control of either House--were coupled
with a disputed presidential election).
should enact bicameral legislation, rather than rely on unicameral
273 Congress
resolutions, because the Constitution requires as much. Certainly, each House has the
ability to adjudicate congressional election contests in a unicameral fashion; this is clear
from Article I, Section 5's empowerment of "Each House." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 1. Yet
this provision almost certainly does not allow either House to regulate others (such as the
states and the federal courts) through unicameral action. To act on others with the force of
law, Congress must adhere to the bicameralism and presentment requirements. Cf. Clinton
v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438-39 (1998) (describing the strict constitutional
requirements of bicameralism and presentment for a bill to attain the force of law). By
virtue of Article I, Section 4, Congress is empowered to enact legislation in the context of
congressional elections. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 131-32 (1976) ('There is, of
course, no doubt that Congress has express authority to regulate congressional elections, by
virtue of the power conferred in Art. I, § 4."). But it may not do so through unicameral
Id. at 133 ("Whatever power Congress may have to legislate, such
resolutions.
qualifications must derive from § 4, rather than § 5, of Art. I.").
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purpose underlying congressional election contests: that is,
facilitating, in a manner that is timely and perceived as legitimate,
the identification of the candidate who received the most validly
cast votes. In pursuit of this end, Congress should seek to advance
the values of impartiality, the appearance of impartiality,
accuracy, and timeliness. Combined, these four values help to
provide a framework for considering the advantages and
disadvantages of alternative procedural regimes. Ultimately, the
approach most likely to succeed is one that expressly empowers
state courts to adjudicate congressional election contests. By
adopting such an approach, each House can do more than resolve
the legal puzzle that has baffled so many; it also can help to clean
up the mess created by Article I, Section 5's ambiguous reach and
meaning. 274
A. THE VALUES AT ISSUE

Congress has the ability to resolve the ambiguity set by Article
I, Section 5.275 It also has the ability to create a more appropriate
regime for the judicial adjudication of election contests. 2 76 it
should embrace this power. In so doing, it should seek to better
fulfill the purpose of congressional election contests (helping to
identify, in a manner that is timely and perceived as legitimate,
274 Although Congress should act through legislation for the reasons stated above, see
supra note 273 and accompanying text, there nevertheless remains the question of whether
even bicameral action would bind either House in future adjudications. Given that Article
I, Section 5 empowers each House, rather than Congress as a whole, to be the judge of the
relevant elections, there is a quite colorable argument that each House retains complete
authority over the procedures it employs in this context-even if enacted legislation
purports to require it to follow separate procedures. (Consider, for example, if a statute
required the dismissal of challenges brought before the exhaustion of state court remedies,
and the Senate simply failed to comply with such a requirement.) Under this conception of
Article I, Section 5, a statute such as FCEA, see supra note 45 and accompanying text, is
merely suggestive, not binding or enforceable. The underlying question (going to whether
either House can, in effect, ever be bound) not only calls into question the efficacy of
possible contested-election reforms; it also may help to explain why Congress has failed to
act in this area. And this problem remains even if each House acts unilaterally; resolutions
reached by one House do not formally bind future Houses. Despite such complications,
legislation does normally bind states, see supra note 273 and accompanying text, and at a
minimum would, in this context, provide them with guidance in how to understand the
relevant constitutional limitations. See supra Section IVA; see also infra Section V.B. As a
result, it remains of significant value in this context. Thanks are due to Professor Brian
Kalt for raising and articulating these concerns.
275 See supra Section IV.A.
276 See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
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the candidate who received the most validly cast votes) by
advancing four main values: advance (1) impartiality, (2) the
appearance of impartiality, (3) accuracy, and (4) timeliness.
The first value, impartiality, is particularly important in the
context of election contests due to the role that partisan affiliation
inevitably plays in such disputes. Unsurprisingly, therefore, calls
for reform in this area have emphasized the importance of
impartiality.
With the Senate facing two protracted and
contentious contests after the 1974 elections, for example,
Claiborne Pell, a Democratic Senator from Rhode Island,
suggested that the Senate create "an impartial, independent
arbiter" to assist it with the task of adjudication. 277 Pursuant to
Senator Pell's plan, this arbiter would provide an advisory report
to the Senate, complete with findings of fact and a recommended
disposition for the Senate to consider as it determined how to
resolve the dispute. 2 78 What this proposed reform shares with so
many others is its emphasis on what Professor Foley refers to as
an "overarching ideal" of impartiality. 27 9
With respect to the second value, the appearance of
impartiality, this reflects the reality that, in the context of
elections, "remedial processes need to be both fair and perceived as
fair." 2 80 Stated otherwise, "[b]allot counting is something for
which appearances truly matter." 28 1
The risk of apparent
unfairness is particularly high when rules seem to be bent or
changed after an election has taken place-which is precisely
when

the

Article

I,

Section

5

quandary

rears

its head.2 82

Maintaining the appearance of impartiality is therefore a critical
function of post-election dispute resolution. Without it, even the
prevailing candidate (and the candidate's supporters) can be
significantly harmed as a result of the undermining of legitimacy.

FOLEY, supra note 59, at 255.
Id.
279 Id. at 5; see also id. at 5-7 (discussing the Grenville Act, which sought to achieve "the
strictest impartiality" in the resolution of disputed parliamentary elections) (internal
quotations omitted); Douglas, Procedural Fairness, supra note 28, at 50 ("Ensuring
impartiality is one of the most important attributes of achieving a fair decision-making
process for election cases.").
280 Huefner, supra note 28, at 289.
281 FOLEY, supra note 59, at 340.
282 See id. at 341 (discussing analogous concerns arising with respect to rules over how to
count votes).
277

278
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Some scholars have credited some of the polarization in Congress,
for example, to continuing ill will that has arisen out of election
contest resolutions that are perceived to be unfair. 28 3
With respect to the third value, accuracy, it goes to the heart of
what is at stake: which candidate received more validly cast votes
in a free and fair election. In the words of Professor Steven
Huefner, "[blecause democratic legitimacy depends on a system in
which votes determine political representatives and policy choices,
any healthy democracy must have a mechanism for accurate and
reliable voting." 2 84
With respect to the fourth value, timeliness, a related set of
concerns is at play. If an election remains in dispute so long that a
seat remains empty even after the term of service has begunwhich can happen in response to a disputed congressional
election 28 5-this constitutes irreparable harm to the candidate, to
the legislative body, and to the electorate at large. Ironically, of
course, the third and fourth values exist in some tension, given the
difficulty of working quickly to reach an accurate decision. 286
Despite this tension, all four values are critical to an effective
system of election dispute resolution.
B. AN APPROPRIATE ARBITER

To better effectuate the four values underlying the effective
resolution of disputed congressional elections-impartiality, the
appearance of impartiality, accuracy, and timeliness-Congress
should clarify the extent to which post-election adjudication may
(and must) occur outside of either House. In so doing, perhaps the
most important decision for Congress to make is to determine the
set of forums on which it will rely. This set of forums would not
displace the ultimate authority that each House of Congress has
over the resolution of election contests; rather, it would assist each

See, e.g., JULIET EILPERIN, FIGHT CLUB POLITICS: How PARTISANSHIP IS POISONING THE
2
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 10-11 (2006) (suggesting that the House's resolution of the
1986 McCloskey-McIntyre contest, which was perceived as unfair by the Republicans, has
contributed to a long-lasting, toxic form of partisanship).
Huefner, supra note 28, at 291.
2
28
See supra notes 249-56 and accompanying text.
286 See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
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House in its adjudicative process. 2 87 With respect to this question
of forum, four potential options exist. First, Congress could insist
that no court-state or federal-adjudicate congressional election
contests. Second, Congress could attempt to enlist the Article III
courts. Third, Congress could create a non-Article III tribunal.
Fourth, Congress could expressly indicate its desire to rely on the
state courts. As discussed below, none of these approaches is a
perfect fit; each has its advantages and disadvantages.
Ultimately, however, the final approach-expressly relying on the
state courts-is likely to come closest to producing an impartial,
timely, accurate, and constitutional adjudication of disputed
congressional elections. Certainly, it would be a significant
improvement over the status quo.
The first approach-preempting all court adjudication of
congressional election contests-does not seem likely to advance
three of the four values identified as critical. (It does, perhaps,
help with problems of delay. 288) It fails to take any advantage at

all of perhaps the most valuable resource in this context: the
courts, which, as less partisan bodies, can help to temper the
party-based partiality that governs in each House of Congress.
Nor does it take advantage of the expertise that the courts have in
fact-finding and in resolving legal disputes. While this first
approach has the benefit of clarifying the legal regime stemming
from Article I, Section 5-thereby avoiding the problems caused by
uncertainty itself28 9-it

otherwise does not seem likely to make the

resolution of congressional election contests any more impartial (in
either appearance or in actuality) or any more accurate. 29 0

287 As discussed above, this Article does not address the possibility of either House of
Congress attempting to renounce its ultimate authority over the resolution of election
contests, a move that seems unrealistic as a political matter and possibly unconstitutional.
See supra note 204.
288 See supra notes 249-56 and accompanying text (addressing delay resulting from the
court adjudication of election contests).
289 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
290 It also has the potential to add to the legal confusion by precluding consideration of
election contests by state courts but allowing analogous work to be conducted by state
administrative bodies. This quickly leads to line-drawing problems, particularly in
jurisdictions that rely on quasi-judicial forms of review.
See supra note 170 and
accompanying text. Were Congress to go a step further and attempt to prohibit states from
addressing election disputes through any means, including through administrative efforts,
the challenges of line-drawing (among other problems) likely would overwhelm the effort.
For when does a state's administration of the election end, and its administrative resolution
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At least as importantly, this first approach does not appear to
As
be the approach that either House of Congress desires.
have
Congress
of
Houses
both
from
committees
above,
discussed
expressed how helpful court adjudication is to the deliberative
process. 29 1 In light of this precedent that has been set, in a sense,
by both Houses of Congress, there seems little reason to advocate
for this first, court-free approach.
With respect to the second approach-enlisting the Article III
292
courts-it has great potential. The trouble, as discussed below,
stems from the political and constitutional challenges it poses. At
the outset, the life tenure provided by Article III permits federal
judges to remain impartial in ways that are more difficult for
judges who are elected. 2 93 The federal courts also seem to be
perceived as impartial-or, at least, more impartial than Congress
or an elected judiciary. 29 4 As generalist judges, this group has
expertise in fact-finding and dispute resolution across different
substantive areas and otherwise has the capacity to work toward
accurate resolutions. And while federal court proceedings often
take a very long time, judges are accustomed to working on
expedited schedules or under significant time pressure. Given all
these advantages, it is perhaps no surprise that some scholars
have pointed to the federal courts when proposing improved
regimes for disputed elections. 2 95 Vesting authority in the federal

of election-related disputes begin? On a more practical note, it seems highly unlikely that
either House of Congress would be willing (or able) to conduct all that work itself.
291 See supra Section II.C.
292 See infra notes 301-05 and accompanying text.
293 See supranote 266 and accompanying text (addressing the election rates of state judges).
294

See, e.g., GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE FREQUENCY

QUESTIONNAIRE 5 (2001), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNationalSurveyRes
ults_6F537F99272D4.pdf (finding that 62% of respondents agreed that the word impartial
describes judges very well or well); id. at 4 (finding that 76% of voters believe that campaign
contributions have at least some influence on judges' decisions); see also Polly J. Price,
Selection of State Court Judges, in STATE JUDICIARIES AND IMPARTIALITY: JUDGING THE

JUDGES 9 (Roger Clegg & James D. Miller eds., 1996) ("Appointment of judges is usually
thought to shield them from partisan interests. . . .").
Bush, and Ballot Boards: The
295 See, e.g., Daniel Tokaji & Owen Wolfe, Baker,
Federalizationof Election Administration, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 969, 995 (2012) ("[W]e
think the increased federal court scrutiny of election administration is a salutary
development, given the greater insulation that federal judges enjoy from partisan politics,
in comparison with most election officials and state court judges."); see also FOLEY, supra
note 59, at 347 (concluding that courts, on average, are better at adjudicating election
disputes than are legislatures, and providing one illustration of the "relative superiority of
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courts has particular advantage in the context of disputed
congressional elections, given the federal interest in such disputes.
If Congress were to vest the federal courts with jurisdiction to
hear disputed congressional elections, moreover, it might do so in a
way that would help to advance the four implicated values.
Congress might, for example, empower not a single trial judge, but
rather a three-judge court, to adjudicate the disputes. It could be
modeled after 28 U.S.C. § 2284, which requires that an expanded
panel be convened in certain redistricting cases. 296 Relying on a

panel, rather than a single judge, seems likely to increase the
likelihood that the tribunal will be both impartial and perceived as
impartial.
Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 2284, however, the regime enacted by
Congress might eliminate appellate review. 29 7 This limited form of
jurisdiction has at least two advantages. First, it significantly
reduces the amount of time the proceedings would take, thereby
advancing the value of timeliness.
Second, it avoids the
involvement of the Supreme Court. This may be a necessary
prerequisite to convincing Congress to enact the reform. If either
House of Congress-as the ultimate arbiter of the election-were
to refuse to seat a Member who had won before the United States
Supreme Court, that might deal a severe blow to the legitimacy of
the election. If a House felt it necessary to reject the findings of a
trial court, by contrast, the blow might be less severe.
Congress also could preempt parallel state court proceedings. 29 8
This would avoid duplicative litigation, reduce forum shopping,
and protect the federal adjudications (in both the courts and each
House of Congress) from any interference by the state court
system. 2 99 Finally, Congress could enact a deadline by which the
the federal judiciary's ability to deliver unbiased ruling' as compared to that of a state
judiciary).
296 See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2012) (requiring a three-judge court when "an
action is filed
challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the
apportionment of any statewide legislative body").
297 By contrast, certain orders issued by a three-judge court constituted pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2284 may be appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1253 (2012) ("[A]ny party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or
denying. . . an interlocutory or permanent injunction . .. in any civil action .. . required . .. to
be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.").
298 As noted above, this nevertheless would pose some line-drawing problems. See supra
note 290 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 248-63 and accompanying
text.
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panel would be required to issue at least preliminary findings.
Perhaps this could occur sometime in late December. Although
this deadline (less than two months after Election Day) is unlikely
to be enough time for a federal court to address an election contest
thoroughly, it at least provides an opportunity to conduct initial
proceedings.
This approach-vesting a limited and specialized form of
jurisdiction in the Article III courts-would help to advance the
four values identified above by incorporating the federal courts in
a meaningful way. While each House of Congress would still be
free to disregard a court's findings, they at the same time would
receive some of the benefits of the federal courts. If Congress were
to couple this with a clear statement that disputed congressional
elections must proceed through this procedure, this approach also
would provide much more clarity and predictability to what is now
such a muddled and problematic regime.
This all said, this approach poses significant-and potentially
insurmountable-problems. At the outset, it becomes problematic
when coupled with state court adjudication. Were Congress to vest
the federal courts with jurisdiction concurrently with the state
courts, then parties would have a great incentive to engage in
forum shopping-which in turn would undermine, at a minimum,
the appearance of impartiality. Alternatively, if Congress were to
vest the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction, that would come
at a major cost, as it fails to draw on the courts that have the most
expertise and insight into the many state laws that govern
congressional elections. 300 The circumvention of the state court
system is also problematic from a political perspective: it is
difficult to imagine Congress enacting such potentially
controversial reform.
Perhaps the most troubling issues arising out of vesting the
federal courts with jurisdiction, however, relate to the
constitutional difficulties that this approach would pose. Among
the concerns raised by relying on the Article III courts are whether
the litigation would be incompatible with the political question

3- Cf. McIntyre v. Fallahay, 766 F.2d 1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 1985) (remanding dispute over
disputed congressional election to state court after concluding that the complaint presented
no question of federal law).
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doctrine, 301 whether the decision to be reached by the panel would
constitute an impermissible advisory opinion, 302 whether the
jurisdictional grant would exceed Article III under the theory that
no federal question is presented, 303 and whether the lack of
appellate jurisdiction would constitute a constitutionally
overbroad jurisdiction strip.3 04 It is not clear whether this
approach could survive such a multifaceted constitutional
attack.305
3o1 An objection on the basis of the political question doctrine might look to dicta in
Roudebush, which stated that "[w]hich candidate is entitled to be seated in the Senate is, to
be sure, a nonjusticiable political question-a question that would not have been the
business of this Court even before the Senate acted," Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 1819 (1972), as well as to the court's reasoning in McIntyre, which concluded that the political
question doctrine precluded its review, 766 F.2d at 1081-83. See also Morgan v. United
States, 801 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reaching a similar conclusion, based on similar
logic, "without [relying on] the amorphous and partly prudential doctrine of 'political
questions' "). But see infra note 305 and accompanying text.
302 A federal court might conclude that a decision in this context constitutes an
impermissible advisory opinion insofar as, in light of Article I, Section 5, "[n]othing [the
court] say[s] or do[es] . .. could affect the outcome of [the] election." McIntyre, 766 F.2d at
1081; see also id. ("When a court has no right to determine the outcome of a dispute, it also
has a duty not to discuss the merits of that dispute."); id. ("The doctrine of justiciability is
designed to prevent meddlesome advisory opinions fully as much as it is designed to prevent
unwarranted interference with decisions properly made elsewhere."). But see infra note 305
and accompanying text.
03 This would not be a concern if a contestant raised a federal claim or if a contestee
raised a federal defense. Absent such an injection of federal law, however, there is an
argument that disputes over elections-even congressional elections-present no federal
question. See, e.g., McIntyre, 766 F.2d at 1083-84 (concluding that complaint in a
congressional election contest presented no federal question). But see infra note 305 and
accompanying text.
304 The Supreme Court has been reluctant to construe statutes in a manner that precludes
its own review. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 574-83 (2006) (rejecting the
argument that the Detainee Treatment Act stripped the Court of jurisdiction over certain
detainee habeas actions); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660-62 (1996) (concluding that
Congress did not repeal the Court's authority to hear original habeas petitions); Ex Parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1869) ("Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the
repealing act in question, that the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas
corpus, is denied. But this is an error. The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction
any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It does not affect the
jurisdiction which was previously exercised."). And it has concluded in at least one context
that such a strip of jurisdiction violated the Constitution. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (finding a violation of the Suspension Clause).
300 The difficulty in predicting how the courts would respond to these challenges derives
largely from the lack of precedent specifically addressing Article I, Section 5, which is such
an unusual provision. If Congress were to adopt the proposed regime-that is, if it were to
vest jurisdiction in the federal courts to adjudicate congressional election contestsCongress might alleviate some of the constitutional concerns by creating a statutory
entitlement to a federally issued election certificate, which would be granted to the
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and
of these political
combination
Assuming some
constitutional problems would prove to be insurmountable,
Congress might look to the third approach: creation of a nonArticle III federal tribunal. The tribunal might look similar to the
Article III tribunal identified above-complete with a three-judge
panel, a lack of appellate review, and deadlines-but it would
avoid the constitutional concerns by enlisting non-Article III
judges.30 6 These individuals could be pulled from the existing nonArticle III bench, or they could be appointed from the general
population.
The trouble with this approach is that the solution to the
problem (that is, avoiding the Article III protections) undermines
perhaps the most compelling reason to rely on the federal
tribunals (that is, taking advantage of those same Article III
protections). 307 The federal courts are, relatively speaking, likely
to advance the ends of accuracy, impartiality, and the appearance
of impartiality precisely because Article III guarantees that judges
can do their jobs without fear of reprisal. By contrast, concerns
over retaliation threaten to undermine the work of a non-Article
III tribunal in the context of a political dispute, particularly one of
such high stakes as a congressional contest.
This approach also fails to take advantage of the expertise of
the Article III judges as generalists. Where would Congress find
the judges to serve on a non-Article III tribunal? 308 If they pulled
individual adjudged to have received the most validly cast votes in a free and fair election.
If the controversy to be adjudicated by the court concerned entitlement to this election
certificate, rather than the more abstract notion of who "won" the election (and therefore
who presumptively would be seated by either House), perhaps that would respond
adequately to constitutional concerns relating to advisory opinions and the lack of a federal
question-and possibly the political question doctrine as well. Thanks are due to Professor
Foley for insightful discussion on this subject.
306 The four constitutional concerns identified above derive primarily from Article III. See
supra notes 301-05 and accompanying text. Relying on non-Article III judges would
sidestep such concerns. Moreover, given the reluctance by the Article III courts to enter the
area of congressional election contests in the first place, adjudication by such a panel surely
would not run afoul of the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence addressing the
circumstances in which Congress may vest jurisdiction in non-Article III courts. See Stern
v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 482-504 (2011) (discussing the constitutional limits on
congressional attempts to vest judicial power in non-Article III tribunals).
307 See supra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
308 In considering reforms to state-law regimes for the adjudication of election contests,
scholars have developed creative responses to this question. See, e.g., Douglas, Procedural
Fairness, supra note 28, at 52 (suggesting that each state enact a regime that "creates a
multi-member panel of judges, political operatives, and experts who have different
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from sitting judges, then the panel very well might consist of some
combination of bankruptcy judges, tax court judges, and
administrative law judges. An esteemed set of jurists no doubt,
but it is not at all clear that such a panel would feel comfortable
adjudicating an election law dispute. Congress instead could pull
judges not from those currently sitting, but rather from the
population at large-but at that point, the panel is even further
removed from the ideal of an impartial and disinterested collection
of expert jurists. In short, while reliance on a non-Article III
tribunal remains an option, it is one that is difficult to support in
light of its failure to take advantage of what the Article III bench
has to offer-particularly once one recalls that this second
approach would trigger the same difficulties related to state court
jurisdiction (either involving forum shopping or the costs of
ousting the state courts of jurisdiction).
This recognition, in turn, leads to the final option: simply
clarifying that the state courts do indeed have the authority to
adjudicate congressional election contests. This approach would
clarify that Article I, Section 5 itself imposes no limitations on the
processes that states can use to administer or resolve their
elections. Jurisdictions that have concluded otherwise would be
free to open their courts, whether through the overruling of court
precedents or through the repeal of jurisdiction strips. 309
Jurisdictions that have attempted to split the difference-to
permit state court adjudication while adhering to some supposed
constitutional limitations imposed by Article I, Section 5-would
be able to reform their laws to reflect the most sensible approach,
not the approach that best straddles the perceived constitutional
line. 310 For all jurisdictions, moreover, Congress could insist on
certain ground rules. These rules could indicate that failure to
exhaust state judicial remedies would prejudice a claim later

backgrounds and expertise to serve as an election contest tribunal," that "gives an equal
number of seats on the panel to those sympathetic to each candidate, while requiring
candidates to identify these prospective members when they file their nominating
petitions," and that "has the candidates or members of the panel together pick mutually
agreed-upon 'neutral' members for the tribunal, or requires a supermajority for any
decision"). Proposals of this sort warrant further examination.
3
See supra Section ILI.B (describing the combination of case law and statutory law that
has closed the courthouse doors in these jurisdictions).
310 See supra Section 111.c (describing jurisdictions that appear to have altered their
procedures in response to Article I, Section 5 concerns).
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brought before either House; 3 11 they could impose a deadline by
which the panel would be required to issue at least preliminary
findings; 3 12 they could insist on certain protections and access to
evidence; 3 13 and they otherwise could impose procedural
requirements that would be likely to promote accurate, impartial,
and timely resolutions that are perceived as fair. 3 14 These sorts of
regulations are likely to pass constitutional muster, in light of
Article I, Section 4,315 and they would constitute a significant
improvement over the current regime.
It is true that an express endorsement of the state courts would
not solve all ills. In many jurisdictions, it would allow continued
reliance on elected state judges, which may undermine the
appearance of impartiality (and perhaps impartiality itself), at
least when compared to reliance on federal judges, who do not face
the political pressures associated with future elections.3 16 It also
would not require states to open their courthouse doors, thereby
leading to the possibility that potential contestants in certain
It
jurisdictions would continue to lack judicial recourse. 317
nevertheless would create a more sensible procedural regime.
Compared to the first regime (which would permit no judicial
resource), a state court-based regime would advance the values of
impartiality, as well as the appearance of impartiality, by allowing
courts to play a role in what is otherwise a highly charged political
process. This regime also would advance the value of accuracy,
both by providing a judicial forum for disputes and by drawing on
the particular expertise that state courts have with respect to
state election law. And while additional processes generally result
311 See supra notes
115, 117, 124 and accompanying text (describing exhaustion
requirement occasionally cited in either House's committee reports).
312 See supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text (discussing the value of timeliness);
supra notes 249-56 and accompanying text (discussing delay resulting from the court
adjudication of election contests).
313 See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text (discussing concerns related to
evidence preservation).
s1 See, e.g., Huefner, supra note 28, at 310-20 (discussing "uniformly desirable features of
election contest statutes").
315 See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
31
See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
317 While an interesting constitutional question arises if Congress were to require that
state courts adjudicate congressional election contests, cf. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729,
742-50 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (advancing the position that the Constitution does
not give Congress the authority to compel a state court to entertain a cause of action), such
a solution seems politically unrealistic, and it is beyond the scope of this Article.
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in additional delay, this state court regime would not necessarily
undermine the value of timeliness, particularly if Congress
imposed, with its reforms, reasonable deadlines. A state courtbased regime also seems likely to be the most realistic option for
reform, given that it is likely to have a much better chance than
the other approaches of making it through the political process. It
comports with the preferences each House has expressed (albeit
indirectly), and it does not require the politically bold move of
preempting all state court jurisdiction in this sensitive area of the
law.
In short, Congress should clarify the Article I, Section 5 line. In
light of concerns over the constitutional, political, and practical
implications, the approach that seems most likely to succeed is one
that relies on state court adjudication of congressional election
contests. As a result, Congress should expressly endorse this
approach, and in so doing, it should establish a set of ground rules
that will help to advance the ends of impartiality, the appearance
of impartiality, accuracy, and timeliness.
VI. CONCLUSION

The ambiguities surrounding Article I, Section 5 are deep and
consequential.
They implicate perhaps the most important of
procedural questions-that of forum-in the context of exceedingly
high-stakes disputes. Although Article I, Section 5 empowers each
House of Congress, neither body has clarified the reach of this
constitutional protection. The federal courts have likewise failed
to fill the gap. The result is an ad hoc, state-based regime
dictating the adjudication of congressional election contests.
The harms of this confused regime are widespread. Disputed
congressional elections are defined by uncertainty, which leads to
the potential for partisan manipulation and illegitimacy. In the
confusing, patchwork regime that currently governs, many
jurisdictions do not allow their courts to adjudicate congressional
election contests at all. In these jurisdictions, there is no judicial
recourse, a troubling result that threatens to undermine accuracy,
impartiality, and legitimacy in the context of congressional
elections. The states that do allow adjudication of congressional
election contests do so in a manner unregulated by Congress.
Adjudication therefore occurs in a manner that risks interference
with the work of either House of Congress, including through
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profoundly disruptive delay. Lurking in the background is the
threat of a constitutional crisis.
The best understanding of Article I, Section 5 recognizes that
this provision empowers each House of Congress. These two
legislative bodies have the ability to clarify the law in this area.
And they should. In so doing, Congress should impose a clear and
sensible regime for the adjudication of congressional election
disputes. A reasonable approach would be to enlist the work of the
federal courts, which enjoy unique and robust protections against
partisan pressures. Yet this approach may be politically and
constitutionally untenable. A better response to the Article I,
Section 5 vacuum, therefore, would be for Congress to acknowledge
explicitly that it desires to rely on the state courts, and to couple
that clarification with regulation of the adjudicative process. By
filling the void in this way, Congress would calm the maelstrom
that has been causing such harm-and, going forward, provide the
clear rules necessary for those navigating such politically
treacherous waters.

